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iv  ABSTRACT 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is a comprehensive study of the activist hedge fund phenomenon, with particular 
emphasis on target firm and return characteristics.  The utilized sample include 3065 activist 
interventions in U.S. publicly traded companies from 1994 to 2013. In general, we employ 
different modifications of the event study framework, investigating abnormal returns in target 
firms caused by activist hedge fund interventions. Our analyses can, to keep contextual tidiness, 
be divided into four separate examinations. Their yielded results should, however, preferably 
be contemplated in coherence. 
 
First, we plunge into the target firm characteristics to unveil whether activist hedge funds 
systematically tilt their investments towards particular company features. Our results indicate 
that activist hedge funds on average target undervalued companies with below-average size, 
leverage and profitability, and above-average cash-on-hand ratios and stock liquidity. 
 
Second, we examine the short-term abnormal returns in target firms. Our findings imply 
statistically and economically positive abnormal returns in the days surrounding the event day, 
which cannot be attributed to abnormal trading volumes when looking at the overall sample. 
We show that these figures are significantly higher in economically stable times than in crisis. 
They are, however, indistinguishable for high frequency (more than ten interventions) and low 
frequency funds (less than five interventions). 
 
Third, we examine the long-term abnormal returns in target companies by conducting calendar-
time monthly portfolio regressions. The findings unanimous imply a positive long-term 
abnormal return in target firms, independent of the macroeconomic conditions and the hedge 
fund track record. 
 
Fourth, we are the first, to our knowledge, trying to explain the cross-sectional differences in 
abnormal returns. We do so by specifying twelve unique models which results imply that target 
firm cash-to-asset ratio, market capitalization, price-to-book ratio, bid-ask spread, as well as 
the hedge fund’s track record and degree of friendliness in the stated tactic are statistically 
significant determinants of the long-term abnormal returns in target firms. With respect to the 
short-term abnormal returns, the overall economic state and the long-term abnormal returns are 
seemingly significant determinants.   
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1    Introduction 
 
“Shareholder activism is not a privilege - it is a right and a responsibility. When we invest in a 
company, we own part of that company and we are partly responsible for how that company 
progresses. If we believe there is something going wrong with the company, then we, as 
shareholders, must become active and vocal.”  
Mark Mobius, Fund Manager at Franklin Templeton Investments 
 
Since its first sporadic signs taking place already in the first half of the 20th century, the 
phenomenon of shareholder activism has expressively amplified in terms of both volume, fame 
and popularity.  In the late 1990s, shareholder activism interlaced with another rapidly growing 
phenomenon; hedge funds, forming the branch in the investment strategy universe we know 
today as hedge fund activism. 
  
The impact of U.S. hedge fund activism is underlined by growth figures over the last pair of 
decades; in 1995, the number of activist hedge funds was 18 - 18 years later, in 2013, the 
corresponding figure had grown to 85. In addition, the assets under management of activist 
hedge funds have grown from just over of $9 bn in 2002, to tenfold the figure in 2013, $90 bn. 
Activist hedge funds’ tendency to make headlines, combined with their latest shift towards 
targeting “blockbuster” companies, have also contributed to its increased popularity and 
relevance. Prominent examples of the latter are the public feud between Carl Icahn and Bill 
Ackman in Herbalife Ltd. (2013), Daniel Loeb’s spin-off campaign in Sony Corp. (2013) as 
well as  Icahn’s push for share repurchases in Apple Inc. (2014). 
 
This thesis aims to unveil and explain the potential drivers behind the surge in popularity and 
volume of activist hedge fund interventions, with particular emphasis on the return 
characteristics. We are curious to see whether the funds historically have been able to create 
significant risk-adjusted returns both in the short- and long-term. Furthermore, we want to 
investigate whether there are any significant differences in returns across economic trends and 
fund characteristics. Lastly, we want to address any cross-sectional differences in returns that 
may exist, trying to uncover its determinants. 
 
Our starting point is shareholder activism in general, building a sound theoretical framework, 
explaining and defining the phenomenon of shareholder activism, as well as its toolbox. We 
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develop a model aiming to explain the rationality behind shareholder activism given its costs 
and benefits. We also discuss the structural and regulative differences between hedge fund 
activists and other types of shareholder activists, before presenting a case study of a successful 
hedge fund activist campaign. 
 
Next, chapter 3 describes the evolution and procyclical nature of shareholder activism from the 
1990s up to present, emphasizing both changes in regulations, sentiment and macroeconomic 
conditions affecting the shareholder activism.  
 
Before conducting our analyses, we considered it a necessity to plunge into the theme’s existing 
literature. We have performed a comprehensive literature review of 39 studies written on the 
relatively broad topic of shareholder activism. We have spent sound amounts of time 
contemplating their approaches and comparing their findings in order to uncover consistencies, 
inconsistencies, potential pitfalls and best practices. A review of the literature regarding target 
firm characteristics and returns is included in chapter 4, while the rest can be read in Appendix 
A. 
 
Chapter 5 gives a brief outline of the methods and procedures utilized in our analysis sections. 
We also state the formal hypotheses of which we aim to answer through our analyses.   
 
Chapter 6 yields a description of our dataset, in which we have put significant time and effort. 
We discuss both its construction and potential shortcomings, as well as its statistical properties. 
Our final sample consists of 3065 activist hedge fund events in U.S public companies from 
1994 to 2013, and is, to the authors’ knowledge, the largest and most complete database of 
activist hedge fund interventions both in terms of number of events and years covered. 
Particularly, no dataset does, to our awareness, include events from 2012 and 2013, which we 
have hand-collected. The comprehensive dataset carries properties allowing us to compare 
trends across times of economic crisis and times of economic stability. In addition, it allows us 
to compare return characteristics across activist hedge funds with varying track records.  
 
Chapter 7 recaps the descriptive statistics and the development in target firm characteristics. 
We compare the average target firm characteristics by year both against its own average, and 
against the NYSE/AMEX average.  In the lights of our findings on target firm characteristics, 
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we also consider the development in investment objectives stated initially by the activist hedge 
funds. 
 
In chapter 8 we analyze the short-term abnormal returns in the target firms in the days 
surrounding the announcement date. We find evidence of significant positive short-term 
abnormal returns, which are not mainly explained by abnormal trading volumes. We also 
conduct analyses comparing the short-term abnormal returns in times of crisis and times of 
economic stable times, as well as on hedge funds with different track records. 
 
Next, we focus on the long-term abnormal returns (12 months). In chapter 9, we conduct a 
calendar-time monthly portfolio regression to see whether activist hedge funds have historically 
created positive risk-adjusted returns. Our results imply that they have, regardless of 
macroeconomic conditions and track record.  
 
In chapter 10, we try to explain the cross-sectional differences in both long-term and short-term 
abnormal returns. We specify several OLS-regression models where the dependent variable is 
long-term (short-term) abnormal returns and the independent variables are target firm 
characteristics, hedge fund characteristics, intervention characteristics and macroeconomic 
conditions. In addition, we include the long-term abnormal returns as an explanatory variable 
when trying to explain the short-term abnormal returns, to see whether the market correctly 
anticipates the gains from activist hedge fund interventions. We uncover several significant 
relationships. However, the chapter also discusses the potential econometric pitfalls and 
limitations of the analysis. 
 
Overall, we feel confident to label our thesis as one of the, thus far, deepest dives into the 
American activist hedge fund universe. We particularly emphasize the development in hedge 
fund activism during the prior 20 years, its return characteristics, as well as the properties of 
the target firms. To the extent of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct several of our 
analyses, e.g. showing the development of target firm characteristics over time, as well as 
explaining the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns based on factors independent of 
the hedge fund itself.  
 
We hope this thesis will contribute towards further research on hedge fund activism.  
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In order to assess the returns to hedge fund activism in a timely manner, we find a thorough 
theoretical framework necessary. The subsequent chapter is organized by first giving a 
definition of shareholder activism and its motives. Second, we sketch out the different ways 
and methods of executing shareholder activism. Third, we model a formal framework showing 
the rationality behind activism. Fourth, we discuss the differences between hedge fund activists 
and other types of activists, emphasizing differences relevant to the determination of returns. 
Last, we present a case study of a successful activist hedge fund campaign. 
2.1   Shareholder Activism: The Search for a Formal Definition 
Shareholder activism is, like any other form of investing, fundamentally stimulated by some 
sort of perceived underperformance. Passive investing, in its most traditional form, is about 
identifying underperforming companies/stocks, enter into a long position and wait around for 
the gap between stock price and the intrinsic value to diminish, partially neglecting the 
shareholder power. Activist investing differs by nature because of its active engagement and 
efforts in influencing and unlocking the value of the investment object. We can say that passive 
investing is about identifying underperformance, while active investing is about identifying 
underperformance, the underlying reason(s) for the underperformance and possible ways to 
break it off and unlock value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The process of passive investing versus the process of active investing. 
Passive Shareholders 
 
 
Identify underperforming company/stock 
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Arguments could be made that the traditional (passive) form of investing, in which the investor 
buys and sells stocks, could be considered active per se, because the investor expresses his 
opinion through transaction actions. A dissatisfied investor could simply sell his shares to 
express his dissatisfaction, a behavior known as “the Wall Street Walk” or “to vote with ones 
feet”.  In addition, we do not refuse the fact that many passive investors utilize their voting 
rights. However, to keep conceptual tidiness, we consider the type of investing mainly involving 
buying and selling stocks as passive.  In addition, investors in the market for “corporate 
control”, i.e. investors aiming for takeovers, buyouts and majority positions are also evidently 
active. Nevertheless, in this thesis we distinctly define activist shareholders as investors in the 
market for “corporate influence”. Our definition of activist shareholders is thus shareholders 
who can be viewed as an intermediate case on the continuum, holding significant blocks, yet 
being minority shareholders. Their position is right in the middle of traditional, passive buy/sell-
investors and investors in the market for “corporate control”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Continuum based on the degree of shareholder activity 
 
Several definitions of shareholder activism are available.  Some state that shareholder activism 
is simply trying to change the status quo through “voice”, without a change in the control of the 
firm (Gillan and Starks, 1996). Some call it “relationship investing”, addressing the cooperative 
association between a corporation and one or more institutional investors, with both sides 
working together to identify the fundamental drivers of underperformance and make changes 
aimed to unlock value. We emphasize, however, that shareholder activism events need not to 
be of a cooperative nature, thus “relationship investing”, might not be a well-suited label. 
According to Becht et al. (2006), shareholder activism refers to “a range of actions taken by 
shareholders to influence corporate management and boards”.   No matter how one engineers 
the definition of shareholder activism, the common denominator seems to be that activist 
shareholders are investors under the perception that the company’s current performance, 
governance structure, management or activities are not optimal, and attempt to revoke a change 
in the company to improve the performance.  
«Passive» shareholders 
 Buy/sell 
 No engagement                
except transactions 
 
«Active» shareholders 
 Corporate Influence 
 Significant blocks, 
yet minority stakes 
 
«Takeover» shareholders 
 Corporate Control 
 Takeovers, buyouts, 
majority stakes 
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In other words, shareholder activism is, ultimately, a response to the potential gains from 
addressing the agency conflict at the core of publicly traded companies with absentee owners, 
when the board fails to perform the required monitoring tasks (Gillan and Starks, 2007). This 
is supported by financial theory frameworks on monitoring, stating that large, institutional 
shareholders are more effective at monitoring than a wide and disperse base of owners. Support 
is also provided by research papers (Brickley et al., 1988; Mehran, 1992) stating that more 
concentrated ownership and appointment of external board members, ceteris paribus, lead to 
more effective monitoring of managers. In addition, the appointment of external board members 
lead to a significant run-up in the particular company’s stock price, i.e. unlocking shareholder 
value (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). This explains why activist shareholders frequently seek 
board representation in their ways of executing activism. However, one must keep in mind that 
increased institutional ownership (thus a lower number of total shareholders) will decrease 
liquidity in the stock (Mukherji et al., 1997; Becht, 1999) which might in turn limit exit 
possibilities and lock-in value. Thus, taking significant blocks in a company to exercise 
monitoring efforts to unlock value must be weighed against the negative effects of lower 
liquidity. 
 
The lion’s share of the agency and monitoring problems arises because of the constructed 
discrepancies between ownership and control in companies, and the conflicts of interest it 
introduces. This may manifest through agency costs of free cash (Jensen, 1986), as well as other 
types of myopic or suboptimal behavior, justifying the activist engagement and monitoring 
efforts. In addition, shareholder activism may also target specific events, best illustrated by 
M&A-cases. For example when the target company has accepted/turned down a takeover offer 
and the activist shareholders disagree and seek to reverse the decision, or when the target 
company has made a bid for another company and the activists aim to block the merger.   
 
Shortly summarized, shareholder activism is the label on investors buying significant blocks, 
yet minority positions (generally 5-20%) in companies, trying to influence management and 
boards using methods which will be outlined in the next section. It is always stimulated by some 
sort of perceived underperformance. This perceived underperformance commonly manifests 
itself on a deep and implicit level, for instance through agency conflicts, suboptimal or value-
destroying managerial behavior (perks or empire building), unfavorable business mixes, capital 
structures and strategies, inconvenient structures of manager compensations or unfavorable 
board compositions. Activist target these companies, utilizing a wide range of tools and tactics 
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to call for change, ameliorate monitoring efficiency and unlock shareholder value.  As 
summarized by Black (1992), “shareholder activism can resolve monitoring and incentive 
problems in widely-held companies and improve corporate performance”.   
2.2   Shareholder Activism: The Toolbox 
While identifying underperformance and the reasons for it are important parts of shareholder 
activism, what have truly attracted attention is their variety of methods and ways to influence 
the management, address change and unlock shareholder value. As activist shareholders’ 
interests are aligned with the remaining shareholders’, the activist shareholders’ main goal of 
maximizing their own profit is per definition the same as “maximizing shareholder value”. First, 
activist investors utilize their voting rights to exercise corporate influence. In addition to buying 
blocks typically in excess of 5%, activists (particularly hedge funds) push up their effective 
ownership share (and thus voting rights significance) by the use of derivatives and borrowed 
shares, a phenomenon labelled “empty voting” (Brav and Mathews, 2011).  
 
Further, as the underlying reasons for underperformance in the target companies, i.e. the 
activists’ objectives, vary to a great extent, so do the activists’ tools for promoting change. E.g. 
shareholder activism frequently include monitoring developments, meetings with management, 
requests of special disclosure and open public meetings for large shareholders, board members 
and management. Shareholder activism methods may, however, also differ greatly in its degree 
of friendliness. For the sake of the intuition, we can separate the activist tactics on a continuum 
based on its degree of friendliness by nature, where the extreme points are friendly activism 
and hostile activism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Shareholder activism tactics by degree of friendliness 
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Shareholder activism, in its friendliest form, might simply be communication between the 
activists and the board and management of the target firms, where they aim to reach agreements 
for what changes are needed in order to unlock shareholder value. According to a presentation 
by Brav (2014), this apparition of activism accounts for 43% of all hedge fund activism events 
from 1994-2011. This type of activism is typically characterized by cooperation between the 
activists and the management, where the activist investor takes on a monitoring role, aiming to 
align the interests of management and shareholders, thus unlocking value from discontinued 
agency conflicts or a refocused business strategy. Another type of friendly activism is 
represented by the cases when the activist shareholder seeks board representation, however 
without a proxy contest or other forms of hostile confrontation, accounting for almost 13% of 
the hedge fund activist events from 1994-2011 (Brav, 2014) . These friendly activist tactics are 
typically characterized by a very general statement in the “purpose of transaction”-paragraph 
in the SC 13D-filing (Item 4), exemplified by Carl Icahn’s statement in his filing on Hertz 
Global Holdings Inc. in August 2014. 
 
“The Reporting Persons [the activist investors] acquired their positions in the Shares in the 
belief that they were undervalued. The Reporting Persons intend to have discussions with 
representatives of the Issuer's management and board of directors relating to shareholder 
value, accounting issues, operational failures, underperformance relative to its peers and the 
Reporting Persons' lack of confidence in management.  The Reporting Persons may also seek 
shareholder board representation if appropriate.” 
 
There is, however,  no smoke without fire, and the hostile reputation particularly affiliated with 
hedge fund activism is not unwarranted.  Of the activist tactics hostile of nature, the most 
prominent examples are the cases where the activists publicly criticize the board or 
management, threaten to wage or carry through a proxy fight, sue the company or intend to take 
control of the company. 
 
The latter is, in all fairness, an activism tactic in the market for corporate control, rather than 
corporate influence. However, it is reasonable to include it in the cases where the activists intend 
to take control of the firm as response to an event-specific underperformance. For instance when 
the activists seek to block M&A-related activity (thus transactions where the investors’ intent 
to take control over a firm is not a response to an explicit event are still not considered as active 
in this regard).  A prominent example is when Mylan Laboratories Inc., in 2004, made a 
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takeover bid for King Pharmaceuticals. Carl Icahn immediately jumped into a position in Mylan 
Laboratories Inc. of 6.8%, publicly expressing his negative stand towards the potential deal in 
a public letter, stating that the deal would be “an egregious mistake” that would change Mylan 
into a “much riskier hybrid focusing on branded products” (Pollack, 2004).  The hostility 
manifested through an open debate where Mylan’s CEO , Robert Coury, stated that “It is 
unfathomable that Icahn, a Mylan shareholder for a little more than one month, could 
reasonably conclude what is in the best long-term interest for all Mylan shareholders”  
(Abboud and Berman, 2004). Carl Icahn answered by putting $5.4 billion on the table, offering 
to buy Mylan as a whole to block the potential acquisition.  Icahn’s proposed takeover was not 
carried through, however; nor was the acquisition of King Laboratories. While intending to take 
complete control over a firm is, seemingly, an effective way of exercising activism, it is a rare 
phenomenon. Brav et al. (2010) reports that this tactic is used only in 4.6% of the activist hedge 
fund events. This modest figure is probably attributed to a combination of the high amount of 
capital needed to take complete control, lowering the credibility of potential takeover threats. 
In addition, most cases are sorted out at lower ownership stakes. 
 
Most common of the methods classified as hostile, is making formal proposals and publicly 
criticizing the company. The criticism can manifest through several forms, however; the most 
frequently used are public letters (often attached to the SC 13D filing). A well-illustrating 
example is Dan Loeb’s, CEO of Third Point Partners,  public letter to the Board of Directors in 
Sunterra Corporation, a vacation ownership company in which Third Point Partners held just 
less than 10% of the shares. The letter is dated July 17th, 2006, and clearly expresses Third 
Point’s disbelief in the board and management:  
 
“…Do not in any way interpret our significant holdings as a sign of support for either 
management or the Company's board of directors….” Loeb also stated that he was perplexed 
by the hiring of the new COO, Keith Maib, after investigating his “apparently sketchy 
employment history”. 
 
Further, Loeb gives his opinion on the future of the company, mainly in capital letters, calling 
for a sale of the company, threatening with a proxy fight. 
“…Indeed, as the largest owner of the Company, we have one simple and explicit message to 
deliver to the Board: WE DEMAND THAT YOU DEVOTE YOUR FULL RESOURCES AND 
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ATTENTION TO SELLING SUNTERRA - EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN ITS TWO COMPONENT 
PIECES - AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE…”  
 
“While you seem to be more comfortable dealing in numbers in the millions, the math here is 
simple: 20% of the outstanding shares are needed to call a special meeting to remove the Board. 
Over 25% of the shares (based simply on public correspondence with you over the past three 
weeks) would be in favor of doing this should you not immediately determine that attempting to 
run the Company yourselves is not an option and that selling the Company is the only logical 
and responsible option that you have.”  
 
Another method, obviously classified as “hostile”, is to threat with, or execute a proxy fight. A 
proxy fight is an extremely disciplining tool in the activists’ possession, and may be seen as an 
extension of the public criticism, putting their money where their mouth is. A proxy fight is, 
simply defined, when a group of (often prominent) shareholders join forces and try to gather 
enough shareholder proxies to win a corporate vote, often aiming to vote out the company 
management or board and replace them with their own nominees. Proxy fights, in many aspects, 
epitomize shareholder activism, as activist shareholders can utilize both their own voting power, 
as well as the power of conviction and communication, in order to team up with other 
shareholders to gather enough proxy votes. However, threats of proxies and proxy fights put to 
effect only accounts for approximately 20% of the hedge fund activist events (Brav et. al 2010). 
It would be fair to attribute a solid share of this relatively humble figure to the costs tied to a 
proxy campaign. This is supported by both empirical and anecdotal evidence. In a survey in the 
late 1980s conducted by Stephen M. Bainbridge, the costs of a proxy contest were estimated to 
$1.8m, however; this figure is probably much higher today. Gantchev (2012) estimate the proxy 
contest to be the, by far, most expensive part of the activist process, averaging to $5.94M. Carl 
Icahn, not unfamiliar with the concept of proxy fights, stated that “At a large public company, 
mailing, printing and other costs can run into the millions of dollars.” (Greenbackd, 2009) 
 
While the costs of proxy fights, ranging from $2-10 m, does not appear like an astronomic 
figure; we have to keep in mind that the average market cap of firms targeted by activist hedge 
funds in our sample is $763 million, while the average ownership stake is just above 9%, 
yielding an initial investment just south of $70 million. These figures are in line with Brav et 
al. (2010). Thus, proxy fight costs in the ballpark of $5 million are economically significant 
relative to the size of the investment.  
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2.3   Modelling Shareholder Activism- a Rational Phenomenon? 
As outlined above, the shareholder activist toolbox is filled with numerous ways of exercising 
activism, varying both along their degree of friendliness and along the cost aspect. As most 
methods of activism are clearly tied to certain types and amounts of costs, it becomes evident 
that this has to be taken into account when considering whether activism is a rational 
phenomenon.  This is confirmed by Ralph V. Withworth, principal of activist hedge fund 
Relational Investors L.L.C, stating in a letter to the SEC that “…only a few investors have the 
expertise and resources to execute a short slate campaign which in our experience can cost 
upwards of $10,000,000 at a typical large US. Company”. 
 
For activism to be rational, like for any other investment decision, the expected benefits derived 
by the activist shareholders (whether a hedge fund, mutual fund, pension fund or private 
investor) must outweigh the costs. As the costs of exercising activism are substantial, this can 
obviously be a major obstacle.  The core of the problem originates from one of the most 
traditional frameworks regarding economics and corporate governance, the free-rider problem. 
This is, shortly put, the situation where some individuals benefit from a good, without paying 
their share of the cost of the benefit. Translated to the activist setting, the situation occurs 
because activist shareholders typically bear all the costs associated with intervention but receive 
only a fraction of the returns corresponding to the size of their minority stake.  One can 
immediately see some potential hitches; as shareholder activists bear all the costs tied to a 
particular activist tactic, and on average only receive just over 9 % of the gains. Thus,  for 
shareholder activism to be rational either the costs have to be sufficiently low, or the gains 
sufficiently high. 
 
To put it formally, we utilize a framework presented by Cheffins and Armour (2012) as a 
starting point. We denote the expected costs of exercising the intended activist tactic 𝑐𝑖, the 
expected benefit caused by the activism accruing to all shareholders of the firm 𝑏𝑖, and the stake 
held by the activists as 𝛼. As a result of our definition of activist shareholders being in the 
market for corporate influence rather than control, 0 < 𝛼 < 0.5. Employing activist agendas 
will thus be rational iff.  
 𝑏𝑖𝛼 > 𝑐𝑖 
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The model presented is simple, nonetheless powerful, as shareholder activism, like any other 
form of economically rational investing, is about making net profits.  In order to fully 
understand the rationale behind shareholder activism, a more thorough contemplation on the 
elements in the model is desirable. 
2.3.1   The Costs Associated with Shareholder Activism, 𝒄𝒊 
The costs brought along with shareholder activism are important factors when considering 
whether shareholder activism is a rational phenomenon. However, these costs are composed by 
several different types, differing both in type and size.  Cheffins and Armour (2012) use a 
classification of costs where they separate financing costs from transaction costs. We, however, 
classify the costs in four groups based on their inherent features and where in the activist process 
they arise: financing costs 𝑐𝑓𝑖, transaction costs 𝑐𝑡𝑖, execution costs 𝑐𝑒𝑖 and monitoring costs 
𝑐𝑚𝑖. 
 
Financing costs relates to the costs of providing the capital needed to make the initial 
investments. Particularly, hedge funds are in the competitive market for investor capital flow, 
i.e. they are dependent on investors willing to back the investment (Burkart and Dasgupta, 
2013).  In booms, this might not be much of a problem, as the access to capital is easy. In a 
depressed economic state, however, when financing is expensive, spreads are high and investors 
have generally lost faith in the market, the total financing costs may be high enough to offset 
the benefits. This might, at least to some extent, explain the significant drop in activist events 
during the financial crisis, as factors driving financing costs upwards will, ceteris paribus, 
reduce the range of companies where activism is rational (as a higher benefit is needed to 
outweigh the increased costs).  In addition, there is an administrative component to the 
financing costs tied to providing funds, for example the hiring of investment bankers, time spent 
on making presentations, host meetings, etc.  
 
Further, a significant portion of the financing costs arises because the activists forgo some of 
the benefits of risk-spreading available to passive, diversified investors (Cheffins and Armour, 
2012). Reported in Brav et al. (2008), the average size of  activist hedge funds was $ 793 
million, pre financial crisis, while a 5% stake in an average top quintile (market capitalization) 
target firm was $760 million. Thus, by buying a top quintile target firm, the hedge fund will 
introduce an extreme amount of idiosyncratic risk. This effect is significant also for companies 
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in lower quintiles as the typical activist hedge fund portfolio consists of 8-10 positions 
(Pancholi, 2012). 
 
The transaction costs mainly comprise costs tied to the transaction process, i.e. when funds are 
already in place. First, this includes both costs related to the search after and research on 
potential target firms.  Second, the transaction costs include the costs accruing due to buying a 
significant stake in the open market, which encompass fees to brokers, bid-ask spreads, 
communication costs (letters, calls, filing a SC 13D) and stock price appreciation (depreciation) 
when accumulating (exiting) the position in the open market. While technological and 
regulatory progress have contributed to lower search and communication costs, it have also lead 
to more efficient markets, taking its toll on the activists returns when trying to enter or exit the 
position in the open market, as their actions will immediately be common knowledge and 
digestible news for the other investors. 
 
Monitoring costs include two types of costs. The first are the direct costs tied to the act of 
monitoring the management, as this is both time and effort consuming. In addition, the 
monitoring costs have an indirect component arising from the reduction in liquidity in the stock 
following the significant stake taken by the activist. The rational is as follows; in order for 
monitoring to be a rational phenomenon, the stake in the company needs to be significant in 
size (to mitigate the free-rider problem), as the monitor must be able to capture a satisfactory 
share of the value unlocked from increased monitoring. However, when taking a stake at this 
size (5%-10%), the activist simultaneously reduce the number of shareholders, and increase the 
ownership concentration, leading to a decrease in liquidity (Mukherji et al., 1997; Becht, 1999). 
This will, all else equal, reduce the value and impede exit possibilities of the stock.   
 
The last sub-group of costs, the execution costs relates to the costs of the activist process arising 
after the position is acquired, and not including the costs of monitoring.  They can be separated 
into two sub-groups; administrative costs and action costs. The administrative costs encompass 
the costs tied to disclosure, hosting meetings, communication, research etc. The action costs 
however account for specific actions undertaken by the activist, mainly including costs related 
to demanding negotiations, aiming for board representation and proxy contests. The costs 
consist mainly of legal and other fees of hiring advisors, solicitors, corporate governance 
experts, investment banks and advertising firms. According to a study by Gantchev (2012), the 
average costs tied to the pursuit for board representation is $1.83m.  Nelson Peltz of Trian 
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Partners, for instance, paid Bear Stearns $1.6m for advisory work on his hunt for board seats in 
H.J. Heinz in 2006. Furthermore, the average costs tied to demanding negotiations and 
executing a proxy contest is $2.94m and $5.95m, respectively.  This brings the total execution 
costs up to an average of $10.7m in cases which go all the way to an executed proxy contest 
(Gantchev, 2012). 
 
Having seen total shareholder activism costs adding up to over $10 million (execution costs 
may be lower if activist investors do not engage in proxy contests, however; the financing costs, 
transaction costs and monitoring costs are not quantified), one can make a fast “back of the 
envelope” calculation to get a grasp of  their significance.  For shareholder activism to be 
rational, if one assumes the total expected costs add up to $10 million, for an activist taking a 
9% stake in a company, the total expected returns (to all company’s shareholders) is going to 
have to count up to at least: 
𝑏𝑖𝛼 > 𝑐𝑓𝑖+𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑐𝑚𝑖 + 𝑐𝑒𝑖 
 
𝑏𝑖 ∗ 9% > $10 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 →  𝑏𝑖 > $111.1 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
Thus for a sample-average market cap company, with a market cap of $763 million, this yields 
a return break-even point for the shareholder activists at 14.6% return on the company’s stock, 
i.e. the net returns to the activist is not positive until the stock return of the target firm is pushed 
above ~15%. 
2.3.2   The Benefits Associated With Shareholder Activism, 𝒃𝒊 
The total benefits from shareholder activist intervention to a target company’s shareholders as 
a whole 𝑏𝑖  is comprised of any increase in shareholder return originating from the activist 
intervention. The percentage of shares owned by the activists 𝛼,  will set an upper bound for the 
proportion of these benefits the activist shareholders will capture. Cheffins and Armour (2012) 
suggest that an additional constraint,  , on the proportion of the benefits an activist will secure 
arises. Investors typically anticipate an activist shareholder’s effort once the activist’s intention  
is public knowledge, and drive the price upwards. I.e. when the public observes an activist 
accumulate shares in a company, they do not wait around for the other shoe to drop, and 
immediately bid up the price to account for the expected activist intervention value. Thus 𝜆  is 
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the maximum block of shares which can be purchased “stealth”, before the transaction is public 
knowledge. Cheffins and Armour (2012) thus modify their model to:  
 
(𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝛼, 𝜆})𝑏𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖 
 
However, this modification puts a quite strong restriction on the post-disclosure stock price run-
up as it assumes that the price run-up happens instantly and perfectly at the moment of 
disclosure.  Empirical results, however, show a continued run-up in the time period after 
disclosure. Thus, shares which are not bought “stealth”, might, in fact, also be able to capture 
benefits, although maybe not to the same extent as the shares bought “stealth”, as they are 
acquired at a higher price. Hence, we rather model the reduction in benefits due to this price 
run-up as a transaction cost. 
 
At the most fundamental, for shareholder activism to be rational, given its associated costs, a 
necessary condition is that there exist companies where 𝑏𝑖 > 0. Thus these companies must be 
undervalued relative to their fundamental value, or there must exist ways in increasing their 
intrinsic value (for instance through an outright sale of the company). However, being 
undervalued per se is not necessarily enough to make a company a rational target for 
shareholder activism. This is because the extent to which an undervalued company represents 
an opportunity to generate benefits from activism depends on the suitability of bringing about 
change. One limiting factor to this is the ownership structure in a company, however; the 
literature is conflicting on this point. Cheffins and Armour (2012) argue that disperse stock 
ownership is a necessary condition for an influence-based intervention, because particular large 
owners may veto unwelcomed shareholder resolutions. Brav et. al (2010) however, argue that 
large, institutional shareholders and concentrated ownership may be an advantage for activists, 
as institutional investors are assumed to be more sophisticated and able to understand and 
support  activist agendas, and also more impactful as their stakes are higher. 
 
Another factor which might affect a company’s suitability of bringing about change is the 
shareholder rights; the legal rules regarding shareholders’ rights to determine the composition 
of the board, exercise a veto over board initiatives, counteract advantages management has in 
securing shareholder support, solicitation of proxies etc.  Legal reforms enhancing shareholder 
rights should thus encourage shareholder activism, as activist can then launch credible 
campaigns against a wider range of companies. 
16 2    SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
In some rare cases shareholder activists may be able to capture private benefits, 𝑝𝑖, which, by 
definition, do not need to be shared with other shareholders (Rock, 1994; Cheffins and Armour, 
2012). One hypothetical way to do this would be by prompting the target to enter into one-sided 
transactions with another entity controlled by the activist, this phenomenon labelled “tunneling” 
is, however, illegal. Another method is “greenmailing”, which is when the target firm must buy 
the shares back directly from the activist, at a premium (bon voyage bonus), in order to make 
the insurgent activist go away, often to prevent a takeover.  In addition, a private benefit may 
be captured by hedge funds with a net short position in a company, however with significant 
voting power through the use of derivatives and borrowed shares to push for corporate actions 
that generate a negative 𝑏𝑖  and thus a positive 𝑝𝑖 . Nonetheless, the latter cases are not 
considered here, as we focus only on activists with a net long position. 
 
Our modified model of rational shareholder activism is thus that shareholder activism is rational 
of nature iff. 
(𝑏𝑖𝛼) + 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑐𝑓𝑖+𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑐𝑚𝑖 + 𝑐𝑒𝑖 
2.3.3   Returns to Shareholder Activists 
While the modified model for rational shareholder activism gives a theoretical answer to when 
shareholder activism is profitable, it does not say anything about the historical profitability to 
activist shareholders; whether the left hand side (LHS) or right hand side (RHS) of the model 
has traditionally dominated activist events. Both Brav et al. (2008) and Boyson and Mooradian 
(2007) find that activist hedge funds on average perform better than a matching sample of hedge 
funds of different styles, indicating that the active component has been profitable, 𝐿𝐻𝑆 > 𝑅𝐻𝑆 
on average. Gantchev (2012), however; finds that the mean net activist return is close to zero, 
but that the top quartile of activists earn higher returns on their activist holdings than their non-
activist holdings, indicating that on average, our model is an equilibrium model which balances: 
 
(𝑏𝑖𝛼) + 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑐𝑓𝑖+𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑐𝑚𝑖 + 𝑐𝑒𝑖 
However; for the best-in-class activists, the activist component yields positive net returns, 
indicating 𝐿𝐻𝑆 > 𝑅𝐻𝑆. One limitation of our model, in the lights of utilizing it in empirical 
studies, would be that some of the factors would be close to impossible to quantify. This 
particularly applies to the private benefits. If the private benefits traditionally have been of 
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economic significance, this would imply a downward bias in the empirical findings on returns. 
We would however, argue that some of the cost components are also impossible to correctly 
quantify, thus deciding on the potential bias’ direction would be mainly conjectures. 
2.4   Hedge Fund Activists Versus Other Types of Activists 
If, on average, our shareholder activist model was not balancing, there would be an arbitrage 
opportunity tied to exercising activist intervention. Nonetheless, there is clear empirical 
evidence that the most highly skilled activists are able to earn stable and significant positive net 
profits. These best-in-class activists have one important common denominator; they are all 
activist hedge funds (Klein and Zur, 2009). So what enables certain activist hedge funds to 
systematically earn positive net profits on an investment strategy of which the average investor 
breaks even? 
 
First, we find it necessary to briefly define the term hedge fund. As the term has no legal 
definition, we follow the approach of Klein and Zur (2011) and Brav et al. (2010). Thus, we 
define a hedge fund as an investment vehicle that is relatively free from the regulatory controls 
of the Securities Act of 1993, the Securities Exchange act of 1934 and the Investment Company 
act of 1940. The funds are usually organized as limited partnerships or limited liability 
corporations. 
 
Activism, both with respect to hedge funds and other shareholder activists (mainly mutual funds 
and pension funds) is still defined as a strategy in which a fund purchases a significant block 
(above 5% in the lion’s share of the cases) in a publicly-traded firm with the stated intent of 
influencing the firm’s policy, agency conflicts or performance. We argue, however, that hedge 
funds differ substantially from mutual funds and pension funds along several dimensions that 
make them better suited for shareholder activism; an assertion that finds substantial support in 
several research papers written on the topic. 
 
First, hedge funds are, as mentioned, lightly regulated. They are only available to institutional 
clients and a limited number of wealthy individuals, relative to mutual funds and pension funds. 
In addition, they are not subject to the strict fiduciary standards mentioned above, nor the 
ERISA and “prudent man” regulations. Hedge funds do not need to be severely diversified in 
order to qualify for tax benefits, while mutual funds cannot own more than 10% of a company 
or invest more than 5% of the fund’s total assets in any one security (Klein and Zur, 2006; Brav 
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et al., 2010; Clifford, 2008; Kahan and Rock, 2007). Hedge funds can thus hold large amounts 
of stock in their portfolio without a tax penalty. Due to the lack of diversification requirements, 
hedge funds can ultimately acquire the target, a definite tool enhancing their relative negotiating 
power with the firm’s management. In other words, while mutual funds and pension funds are 
stuck in the market for corporate influence, the hedge funds can enter the market for corporate 
control if the market for corporate influence is insufficient.  
 
Second,  their intervention in the target companies carries a significant amount of flexibility as 
hedge funds (in opposition to mutual funds and pension funds) can utilize both the derivatives 
market and the stock lending market in order to increase effective voting rights through 
undisclosed transactions (Hu and Black, 2006; Christoffersen et. al, 2006). Thus, hedge funds 
are able to accrue large blocks of voting rights, either through direct or indirect purchase of 
common shares, enhancing the significance of their voting power. This may be one of the 
reasons why hedge funds are, reportedly, extremely successful in getting existing management 
to acquiesce to their demands, with average success rates (across initial demands and tactics) 
in excess of 60% (Klein and Zur, 2006). 
 
Third, hedge funds have a greater ability than mutual funds and pension funds to invest in 
illiquid assets. While mutual funds are required to redeem shares on short notice, hedge funds 
are not subject to similar requirements (Kahan and Rock, 2007). As mutual funds are required 
to maintain sufficient liquidity in their portfolios to allow for daily withdrawal requests from 
shareholders, hedge funds operate with lock-up periods, preventing investors from withdrawing 
their principal, often up to at least 6 months (Clifford, 2008). As successful campaigns may 
require funds to hold large, illiquid blocks, and more concentrated ownership carries lower 
liquidity, liquidity concerns impose costs on the mutual funds which are less evident for hedge 
funds (Aragon, 2007). In addition to making hedge funds less sensitive to sudden liquidity 
shocks. 
 
The fourth, and last, obvious difference between hedge funds and mutual/pension funds is the 
organizational structure of the fund. Put more formally, the hedge fund structure’s suitability to 
engage in activism. Hedge fund managers are free from “pay-for-performance” restrictions 
imposed on mutual fund managers by the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. As mutual fund 
managers are paid in a percentage of the fund’s asset under management, a hedge fund 
manager’s compensation package, in contrast, consists of a percentage of invested funds as well 
2    SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19 
 
as a percentage (often 20%) of the fund’s excessive returns. Thus the manager can personally 
benefit from a successful activist campaign.  In addition, a hedge fund manager typically invests 
a substantial amount from their personal wealth into their own funds (Brav et al., 2010). Thus, 
they have a strong incentive for making profits and investment returns, better aligning the 
interests of the manager and the investor, hence mitigating potential agency conflicts. 
 
Hedge funds typically target companies rich in cash and short-term investments, with low debt 
ratios, often increasing debt, payouts and monitoring efforts while reducing cash, hence aiming 
to reduce the agency problems of free cash flows. However, as discussed earlier, monitoring, 
while being an important component in unlocking value, does not come without costs. The 
benefits, on the other hand, were enjoyed by all shareholders. Looking back at our model for 
rational shareholder activism, the difference between hedge fund activists and other shareholder 
activists, and thus the reason some hedge fund activists systematically earn positive returns 
from active campaigns, stem from both the benefit side and the cost side of the inequality:  
 
(𝑏𝑖𝛼) + 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑐𝑓𝑖+𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑐𝑚𝑖 + 𝑐𝑒𝑖 
 
The impact on the benefit side is mainly due to the structural and regulatory differences 
separating hedge funds from mutual funds. As hedge funds can increase their effective voting 
power, and hence significance of influence, through utilization of the derivatives and the stock 
lending market. In addition, their lightly regulated reality, allowing them to eventually buy out 
the target firms, gives the hedge funds a definite tool, enhancing their bargaining power. Thus, 
it is fair to say that on average: 
 
[(𝑏𝑖𝛼) + 𝑝𝑖]𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 > [(𝑏𝑖𝛼) + 𝑝𝑖]𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 
 
There is however, also an element affecting the cost dimension of activism, namely the 
organizational structure and compensation system in the hedge funds. As it, to a larger extent 
than in mutual funds, mitigates agency conflicts in the fund internally.  Thus, on average, we 
can say that: 
[𝑐𝑖]𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 < [𝑐𝑖]𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 
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2.5   A Case Study: McGraw Hill and Jana Partners 
In mid-2011, Jana Partners put their money where their mouth was, and approached McGraw 
Hill, an educational publisher, which had been performing poorly over the last couple of  years. 
The company had experienced stagnant growth, but accumulated large amounts of cash.  
 
Figure 4: McGraw Hill case study – revenue and cash development 
  
The performance had been followed by poor returns to shareholders, and the valuation had now 
hit rock bottom compared to peers, trading at a ~15% discount on several multiples (Bloomberg, 
2014).  
 
Figure 5: McGraw Hill case study - total shareholder return 
 
Jana Partners expressed “You’re stuck with us. If we don’t succeed this year, we’ll be back next 
year” (Bloomberg, 2014). They listed demands; split the company into separate entities and 
pursue an aggressive share buyback program. McGraw-Hill agreed, and issued a public 
statement stating a “Comprehensive portfolio review… designed to unlock superior 
shareholder value”. Several demands were met, both breaking the company into two entities 
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12% Excess Return 
and increasing the buyback program, thereby avoiding a proxy fight. The results were also 
positive:  
 
 
Figure 6: McGraw Hill case study – return development with activist 
 
Note that the previous successful case study says nothing about risk-adjusted returns. We turn 
to this in a moment, but find it useful for illustrating the desired process of the activists. 
 
To summarize, this chapter has discussed the definitions of shareholder activism, as well as its 
reasons and varying methods of execution. Further, we discussed the rationale behind the 
activist phenomenon, as well as potential reasons for why hedge fund activist may be able to 
systematically outperform other types of activists. We now have a theoretical framework to 
investigate and analyze the return characteristics of hedge fund activists. 
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3    The Evolution and Procyclical Nature of Shareholder Activism  
 
As we aim to analyze and unveil patterns in activist hedge fund returns across different 
macroeconomic conditions, we find it natural to describe the evolution of shareholder activism 
and its procyclical nature. Our starting point is the 1990s, as this is also the starting point of our 
sample. For a description of shareholder activism in the U.S. before 1990, we refer the reader 
to appendix D. 
3.1   The 1990s – Institutional Activist Investors to the Fore 
The 1990s was, mainly, a decade where most of the activism was accounted for by public 
pension funds, mutual funds and union funds. While they submitted fewer proxy proposals than 
before, they became more active in initiating dialogue with targeted companies’ management 
and boards, as well as in utilizing media to notify current investors in the target firms about the 
problems and intended solutions.  
 
Even though the 1990s brought with it a decline in the takeover market, and regulatory and 
legislative changes enhanced the ability of shareholders to communicate on voting issues, hedge 
fund managers were slow to get on the activist wave. This, despite the fact that hedge funds per 
se rapidly extended its reach as an investment option and developed through what the chairman 
of the SEC called “a seismic boom” (Cheffins and Armour, 2012). While there were only 300 
reported hedge funds in the U.S at the start of the decade, that figure grew to approximately 
3000 in 1998, while the assets under management grew from $40billion to $300 billion (Partnoy 
and Thomas, 2007).  
 
While the most newsworthy hedge fund players in the 1990s were those carrying out macro 
bets, without any activist agendas, some hedge funds started utilizing shareholder proposals to 
proclaim publicly for change in public companies in the second half of the decade. A describing 
example is Greenway Partners, which used shareholder proposals to push for changes in 
companies like U.S Shoe, Woolworth and Unisys Corp. However, hedge fund activists were 
still the exception rather than the rule, as illustrated by Tiger Fund, a Julian Robertson founded 
hedge fund that had historically been a traditional value-oriented hedge fund. When they picked 
up a sizeable portion in U.S. Airways Group calling for change in the corporate governance, 
the Wall Street Journal characterized the accumulation of such a stake as “an unusual step for 
a money manager to take” (Pulliam and Pacelle, 1999). 
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Whereas hedge fund activism was still rather uncommon phenomenon in most industries, the 
financial sector proved out to be an exception. In 1996, U.S Banker ran a story about Stephen 
Gordon, a former investment banker running Genesis Financial Partners, who “loved to take 
big positions in community-based financial institutions” with a track-record of poor 
performance, and “throw his weight around” (Zuckerman, 1996). Hedge fund activism in other 
industries did however, happen sporadically, even though not to today’s extent. Prominent 
examples are Soros Fund Management, Gabelli Funds and Farallon Capital Management, as 
well as earlier mentioned Carl Icahn and Steel Partners taking on stakes across a range of 
industries. Thus, while hedge funds in the 1990s primarily were not activist players, the hedge 
fund activism in the financial sector, and the glimpses of hedge fund activism elsewhere could 
be perceived as a warning shot of what was about to come. While we were only observing the 
tip of the iceberg, the hedge fund activists were picking up severe pace in the late 90s, getting 
ready to take on the center stage.  
3.2   The Early 2000s – Hedge Funds Becoming the New Figurehead of Activists 
In 2001, The Wall Street Journal wrote, “dissatisfied shareholders are aggressively pushing 
companies to find new ways to unlock shareholder value”. The mentioned shareholders were 
hedge fund managers, who had traditionally been passive in nature, stepping into the fields of 
activism. Only four years later, in 2005, the Wall Street Journal wrote “Hedge Funds are the 
new Sheriffs of the Boardrooms” and the Business Week referred to an “exploding number of 
activist hedge funds” (Cheffins and Armour, 2012). Our dataset yields the same story, by 
showing a vast surge in hedge fund activism starting post dot-com crisis, indicating the first 
real glimpse of procyclical behavior observed by activist hedge funds over the last two decades 
(Burkart and Dasgupta, 2013). 
 
Hedge Fund Activists did not beat around the bush, and in opposition to their 1940s origins, 
“the Wall Street Walk” did not seem like a suited option to express dissatisfaction with the 
performance of their target companies. Their strategies and lines of actions were point-blank 
and strikingly more aggressive than what earlier activists had utilized. This was well 
encapsulated by  Institutional Investor’s description of activist hedge funds, using phrases like 
“no nonsense”, “seize the board”, “put the company in play”, “do whatever it takes to increase 
the stock price” to describe hedge fund activists (Taub, 2003).  
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Hedge fund activism also took varieties of forms, from public pressure on portfolio companies 
to change its business strategy, to the running of proxy contests to gain seats on the board 
(Kahan and Rock, 2007). Illustrating examples include when Third Point Management picked 
up a 6% stake in Star Gas, a heating oil distributor, in 2005. Third Point’s manager, Daniel 
Loeb first openly and severely criticized the management, before letting the CEO, Irik Sevin, 
feel his wrath through a public letter attached to the SC 13D filed in February 2005: 
 
“…It is time for you to step down from your role as CEO and director so that you can do what 
you do best: retreat to your waterfront mansion in the Hamptons where you can play tennis and 
hobnob with your fellow socialites”.  Loeb further wondered, “How it is possible to select your 
elderly 78-year-old mom to serve on the Company’s Board of Directors and as a full-time 
employee? We further wonder under what theory of corporate governance one’s mom sits on a 
Company board?” and stated that “I was amused to learn, in the course of our investigation, 
that at Cornell University there is an “Irik Sevin Scholarship”. One can only pity the poor 
students who suffers the indignity of attaching your name to his academic record”.   
 
The tactic worked, and a month later mister Sevin bowed to the pressure and threw in the towel 
both as CEO and as Director. 
 
The reasons for the procyclical mid-2000s hedge fund activism rush are addressed by Cheffins 
and Armour (2012), who mention numerous factors which may have contributed to make it a 
”activist hedge fund-friendly” environment.  First, deregulation regarding the investor 
eligibility to invest in hedge funds accounted for its part of contribution to the hedge fund boom 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Second, a potential driver of the hedge fund activist surge 
was the vast number of undervalued companies left behind after the dot.com bubble bust. In 
addition, high profile scandals like Enron, Tyco and Worldcom brought the quality of 
management in U.S. public companies to the table, and, combined with low valuation multiples, 
reinforced the idea that shareholder value could be created through active engagement. 
 
Other factors emphasized in Cheffins and Armour (2012) were the cheap and easy accessible 
debt markets, as well as the cash accumulation in public companies. The S&P 500 companies 
had in 2005, accumulated between them $650 billion in cash, double the corresponding figure 
from 2000. The cash build-up prompted activist shareholders to argue that executives should 
return funds earning trivial returns in the corporate treasury, to shareholders by increasing 
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dividends, share buybacks or put the business up for sale, all which were relatively easy to 
arrange due to favorable conditions in the debt market. 
3.3   The Financial Crisis – Taking its toll on Hedge Fund Activism  
The dramatic and rapid share price drop that accompanied the financial crisis in the years around 
2007-2009 theoretically could have increased the number of hedge fund activist events through 
a vast number of companies with potential discrepancies between share price and intrinsic 
value. 
 
However, despite the potential of finding undervalued companies and a ripe market for industry 
consolidations, the financial crisis took its toll on hedge fund activism, both regarding the 
number of deals carried through and the number of activist hedge funds in total. The main 
reason that hedge fund activism dwindled was what Financial Times, in 2007, referred to as the 
“credit crunch”. The cheap debt from the mid 2000s was gone (see figure 7) and it became 
harder to convince boards to change their balance sheet by adding costly debt to increase 
payouts. To carry through divestitures or spin-offs also became harder, seeing that there were 
few prospective bidders. This was all well summed up in a 2007 article in Financial Times:  
 
“Today, pushing a company to take on more leverage would be dismissed as downright foolish. 
Investors also have more pressing concerns. When the stability of the banking system is in 
doubt, shareholders are less likely to join a campaign to shake up HSBC’s corporate 
governance. However, in today’s more austere environment, companies will also find it harder 
to cover up their poor performance. Activist investors may find they have a greater choice of 
legitimate targets, but fewer tools to work with.” (Larsen, 2007). 
 
With unfavorable debt markets, complicating the targeting of payouts, capital structure or 
spinoffs/divestitures, hedge fund activists had to target business strategy and operating 
efficiency. However, with markets overwhelmed by uncertainty and distrust, shareholders 
generally were skeptical to activism aiming to change status quo. This was addressed in a 
Financial Times article in 2009: “Big long-only investors don’t want to know about unlocking 
value right now. They’re still just concentrated on preserving it.” (Jones, 2009). 
 
The results of the credit crunch and financial crisis were brutal from an activist hedge fund 
perspective.  Hedge fund returns were all-time low in 2008, assets under management fell as a 
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rock due to investors’ withdrawals, amplifying the procyclicality of activism (see Chapter 7). 
Cerberus Capital, a leading investor in the collapsed US car industry received redemption 
requests amounting to $5.5 billion of their $7.7 billion under management (Jones, 2009). Steel 
Partners’ assets under management fell by half and Carl Icahn had to contribute $500 million 
of his own personal fortune to pay out investors seeking for exit. The activist hedge funds did, 
in fact, particularly badly. As they, by construction, use hedging to a much less extent than 
many of their corresponding funds utilizing other strategies, they became severely sensitive to 
the share price decline.  In addition, the share price decline was particularly heavy in the 
small/mid-cap companies, where activist hedge funds tend to focus their investments. 
 
To summarize, the financial crisis made its presence significantly felt on activist hedge funds. 
Many of them reduced their portfolios in order to focus on a smaller number of companies. 
Some funds even had to close down; The Children’s Investment Fund Management left the 
activist sector in 2009, the same year as Atticus Capital closed down. Harbinger Capital Partners 
shut their doors in 2010, while Icahn closed his activist hedge fund in 2011, stating that he 
would continue to use his own fortune to pursue activist campaigns instead.  
3.4   2011-2014 - Procyclical Activist Hedge Funds Getting Back on Their Feet  
While the financial crisis took its toll on hedge fund activism, the latest years have shown signs 
of recovery. Prominent activist players, like Third Point, Jana Partners, Pershing Square Capital 
Management and Carl Icahn are back in the game like never before, targeting large, public 
companies, often with huge piles of cash, throwing their weight around.  Market capitalization 
does not seem to be an obstacle of significance, as some of the most prominent activist hedge 
funds have accumulated stakes in several blockbusters companies lately. Examples are Jana 
Partners’ and Carl Icahn’s positions in Netflix, Third Point Partners’ stakes in Google, Fedex 
and Cisco, Carl Icahn’s position in Apple and Pershing Square Capital Management’s position 
in Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. Part of this shift towards targeting larger companies may be 
attributed to changes in corporate governance regulations from 2010, such as “Say-on-pay” 
rules (see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). 
 
Piles of cash, increased payouts and leverage ratios evidently seem to be on the activist menu 
once again, while recovering from the credit crunch during the financial crisis. Favorable debt 
markets make companies with balance sheets filled with accumulated cash easy targets. In 2012 
and 2013, 25% of the deals targeted payouts and capital structure explicitly. 
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The markets and environment strikingly recall the hedge fund activist-friendly environment of 
the early 2000s (post dot-com crisis), with favorable debt markets, industries ready for 
consolidations and investors once again confident in investing in stocks and hedge funds (see 
figure 7). While 2011 was a year for activist hedge funds to recover consciousness, 2012 and 
2013 might have been the start of a new surge in hedge fund activism. This supports the 
observations of procyclical activist hedge fund behavior. While the dot-com crisis and, in 
particular, the Financial Crisis took its severe toll on hedge fund activism, the years of booms 
have traditionally been accompanied by increases in hedge fund activist campaigns. This 
procyclical phenomenon can be largely explained by the hedge funds need and competition for 
investor flow, as well as macroeconomic conditions (Burkart and Dasgupta, 2014). 
 
In this chapter, we have outlined the evolution of hedge fund activism as well as its apparent 
procyclical behavior. This gives a sound and needed theoretical foundation to build upon in our 
subsequent analyses, when investigating activist hedge fund return characteristics across times 
with different macroeconomic conditions. 
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Figure 7: Index development, cost of debt versus equity yield and no. of hedge fund events. 
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4    Literature Review  
 
When preparing our thesis, we conducted a thorough literatur review, spending time to 
investigate and understand results found by other researchers. Furthermore, we have closely 
looked at the methodologies used, and the factors considered to explain the phenomenon of 
hedge fund activism. This chapter focuses on empirical and theoretical literature written on this 
topic, and will help us understand earlier research in-depth. Moreover, it will give us the 
fundament to compare our own results in subsequent chapters to those of earlier studies.  By 
studying 39 empirical and theoretical studies from recognized journals, we have screened, to 
our knowledge, the entire literature in the field. Hence, we are rather well positioned to conclude 
on the similarities and the discrepancies that exist in the research on the topic. As previously 
noticed, we focus solely on the U.S. in this review. Several research papers have looked into 
activist investors and hedge funds in particular. Research topics span from abnormal returns to 
wealth expropriation of bondholders, geographical differences, and long-term effects of 
activism. In this chapter, we focus on abnormal returns to target shareholders, while only briefly 
discussing other themes. We refer the interested reader to an extensive literature review in 
Appendix A, where we cover all topics the authors have found related to the theme, in depth. 
This chapter is organized in the following manner: First, we look at previous articles and their 
results to give the reader an understanding of earlier research. Second, we emphasize the 
difference in the previous researchers’ time span. Third, we investigate findings on target firm 
characteristics. Finally, we examine the differences in the papers investigating abnormal returns 
to get a sound understanding of best practices and potential pitfalls to avoid. 
4.1   Previous Research on Abnormal Returns 
The evidence of positive abnormal returns in the target firm’s stock around filing- or 
announcement day is the most incontrovertible1. However, for long-term abnormal returns the 
results are somewhat inconsistent. Klein and Zur (2009) find positive abnormal returns in the 
subsequent year of activism, in line with Stokman (2007) and Clifford (2008).  Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) however, only find significant positive long-term abnormal returns for targets 
ultimately acquired. Brav et al. (2008; 2010) find no evidence of negative abnormal drift during 
the 1-year period subsequent to announcement, suggesting that the short-term abnormal run-up 
not comes at the expense of longer-term returns. However, no evidence of positive abnormal 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Klein and Zur (2006), Boyson and Mooradian (2007), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Clifford (2008), 
Brav et al. (2008 & 2010), Bebchuk et al. (2013), Stokman (2007)  
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returns in the long-term is found either. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) find evidence of 
abnormal stock-returns and improved operating performance in the long-run, however; these 
results are only valid for high frequency funds. 
4.2   Difference in Time Spans and Sample Size - Implications 
Earlier research papers have used time spans with large differences to investigate the effects of 
activist hedge funds.  When utilizing samples from different time periods incorporating 
different economic cycles, one will also often experience different results, especially with 
respect to returns. As seen from the graph below, there are large discrepancies in the time span 
studied. 
  
 
 
Furthermore, the number of total events vary both as consequence of the time period as well as 
selection criteria. Researchers have included everything from approximately 150 to above 2000 
events. As there exists no complete database of activist hedge fund events, there have also been 
discrepancies in the selection criteria (see Appendix B for full overview). E.g. Professor Alon 
Brav has more or less used all 13Ds filed by activist hedge funds in his research, searching 
through various databases to find out whether the filing constitutes a hedge fund or not. Others 
have collected information regarding only some activist hedge funds and subsequently found 
whether they have filed 13Ds in their time period. These differences, we show, lead to different 
conclusions both due to small sample sizes, short time trends and various event windows. We 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Klein & Zur (2009)
Brav et al. (2010)
Clifford (2008)
Gantchev (2012)
Stokman (2007)
Boyson & Mooradian (2011)
Aslan & Kumar (2014)
Bebchuk & Brav (2013)
Greenwood & Schor (2009)
Overview of Time Span for Earlier Research on Abnormal Returns 
Figure 8: Difference in time periods for earlier studies 
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now turn to investigate target firm characteristics, time trends, what is written on short-term 
returns and subsequently long-term returns, with the aforementioned differences in mind.   
4.3   Target Firm Characteristics  
On the issue of target firm characteristics, researchers agree on certain things, while disagreeing 
on others. First, there is consensus on the matter of size: targets are smaller companies than 
control samples, making it less capital intensive to accumulate shares.  Second, most have found 
lower valuation metrics in target firms compared to control samples. Zhu (2013) argues that 
this leaves larger room for improvement, and easier to gain support from current shareholders. 
On the issue of profitability, most researchers agree both in terms of targets’ low growth and 
strong profitability (ROA) compared to control samples. In terms of capital structure and 
liquidity, there is to say the least, inconsistency. While some studies find that targets have higher 
cash-to-asset ratios than control samples, others find the opposite. The same applies for leverage 
ratios, where some studies find higher leverage for target firms, and others argue for 
indistinguishable leverage ratios. Furthermore, Greenwood and Schor (2009) find that target 
firms have thin analyst coverage, disagreeing with Brav et al. (2010), using a similar approach 
for matching portfolios, and more or less same time span of data, but different sample size. We 
summarize most findings in the table below. Signs of “+” indicates higher or larger ratios than 
control firms, while “÷” goes in the opposite direction. Lastly “-“ indicates figures not 
distinguishable from the control sample.  
 
 
Boyson & 
Mooradian (2010) 
Klein & Zur 
(2006) 
Brav et al.   
(2010) 
 Zhu    
(2013) 
Clifford 
(2008) 
Size & valuation           
Market Cap ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷  
Valuation metric ÷ ÷  ÷ ÷ 
      
Profitability           
Growth ÷  ÷   
ROA + + +  + 
      
Capital structure           
Cash/Assets - +  ÷ ÷ 
Leverage - - ÷ ÷  
Payout ratio ÷  ÷ ÷ - 
      
Data           
N 418 155 1032 1264 788 
Time period 1994-2005 2003-2005 2001-2006 1994-2007 1998-2005 
Comparison 
Matching 
portfolios 
Matching 
portfolios 
Compustat 
universe 
Compustat 
universe 
Passive 
investors 
Table 1: Overview of findings in earlier studies of on target firm characteristics 
32 4    LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Despite the absence of uniform results, some conclusions are apparent. First, historically targets 
have been small companies with low valuation metrics, having sound profitability.  We show 
in our “Descriptive Statistics and Target Firm Characteristics” – chapter the reason behind some 
of the differences, as we graph the development of most interesting ratios and measures, and 
show differences in time trends.  
4.4   Abnormal Returns and Value Creation  
 4.4.1   Short-Term Abnormal Returns 
The natural question to ask when assessing hedge fund activism is, of course, whether they get 
bang for their buck, i.e. whether the firms they target earn positive abnormal returns, and hence 
create shareholder value. Several research papers have looked into target firm abnormal returns, 
both short-term to see whether the shareholders immediately price in a successful activist 
campaign discounted for the risk of failure, and longer-term returns to assess whether activist 
actually create value and are not shortsighted.  
 
  
 
Figure 9: Review of cumulative short-term abnormal returns 
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The studies reviewed unanimously agree on positive abnormal short-term returns on average in 
their studies, with a total average of 5.3%. They range from a low 2% found by Boyson and 
Mooradian (2010)  in their (0,2) event window, to a maximum of 9.5% in Stokman’s (2007) (-
25,25) window . Figure 10 shows the cumulative distribution of the returns. With a low sample 
size in mind, the distribution is platykurtic (negative excess kurtosis). Furthermore, it points to 
a lower probability of experiencing events at the far end of either tail, while observations around 
the mean are more frequent than for normally distributed variables. Moreover, the distribution 
is weak but positively skewed to the right (0.07), indicating that tail events happen more 
frequently at the upside of the average. We discuss the shortcomings related to the mentioned 
research in the data chapter, showing that multiple factors bias the estimate of the short-term 
abnormal returns, most prominently too short or too long event windows, short time series and 
small sample sizes.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Cumulative distribution functions across studies reviewed  
 
Considerable amounts of research have been done to understand what creates short-term 
abnormal returns, and researchers agree that this mainly lies in the different objectives hedge 
funds seek to complete. Brav et al. (2010), Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Clifford (2008) 
find that abnormal returns are the highest when the stated objective is to eventually sell the 
target firm or spin-off certain business units. Objectives purely targeting capital structure or 
corporate governance earned the lowest abnormal returns, in contrast to Boyson and Mooradian 
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(2011) who found that highest the abnormal returns were achieved for corporate governance 
related objectives.  
4.4.2   Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
While the evidence of positive abnormal returns for the target firms in the short-term is strong, 
the research on target firms’ long-term returns are somewhat inconclusive. We review five 
studies on long-term abnormal returns covering at least a six month window. Due to differences 
in both sample sizes, event windows, years covered and analysis, we find the small number of 
studies less relevant to analyze statistically. Rather, we look at them seeking to understand 
differences.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Summary of long-term abnormal returns in studies reviewed 
 
The result is an average of the aforementioned researchers of 17.9%. However, the comparison 
is not really fair as they are not unanimous in neither their significance nor their results. While 
Stokman (2007) finds significant positive abnormal returns over the 6-month window for all 
events, Greenwood and Schor (2009) find significant positive long-term abnormal returns for 
targets that are ultimately acquired. Hence, the illustrated 10.26% are pulled up by these events, 
and Greenwood and Schor’s (2009) analysis on long-term returns, conditional on the outcome, 
shows 25.85% Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for targets acquired, but not 
distinguishable from zero for all other targets. Their results are in line with the results of Clifford 
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(2008), who finds that improvements in operating performance mainly are attributable to 
spinoffs of underperforming assets. The results of Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Clifford 
(2008) are partly conflicting with Boyson and Mooradian (2007) who found that the most 
dramatic changes in performance relate to cases where the activists seek corporate governance 
changes. Furthermore, Klein and Zur (2009) look at confrontational events, not including 
general and unspecified objectives. In conclusion, the differences are significant and large. We 
find that studies looking at average holding period (e.g. Brav et al., 2010) indicate periods of 
approximately 1 year. Hence, studies below this will not necessarily be able to capture the 
changes conducted by the activist. Furthermore, there are large differences in selection criteria 
yielding different sample sizes, as well as event windows and time period covered. By example, 
Stokman (2007) who first locates hedge funds and thereby their filings, exclude a large number 
of funds and may be biased towards less profitable funds when only reviewing 90 deals in the 
U.S. markets. Furthermore, due to Klein and Zur’s (2009) short time period, their results may 
just reflect the average return of the years included. As shown later, there are large differences 
in yearly CAR, and between periods of crisis and economically stable times. This may suggest 
biases leading to the discrepancy.  
 
After a thorough review of the existing empirical literature on activist hedge funds, we believe 
we are left with a sound understanding of limitations and pitfalls in previous papers. Some 
methodological issues have been identified, and subsequently will lay the basis for both the 
methodology and data chapter. We leave obvious reasons as sample size and time trends out.  
 First, event windows for short-term analysis need to be able to capture the run-up from 
the ten-day interval after the block holder has bought its shares, towards the filing date. 
Papers using time trends from t=0 (filing date), shows significantly lower CARs. 
 Second, an event window for long-term analysis should be no less than 10 months, so 
that the hedge fund has time to achieve some changes. 
 Finally, target firm characteristics should be investigated in different periods to correct 
for economic cycles.  
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 5    Methodology   
 
This chapter summarizes the methodology utilized, as well as the hypotheses of which we aim 
to answer. More formally, the chapter starts with a definition of abnormal returns and the 
framework used to specify the abnormal returns. Next, we give a brief discussion of the event 
windows utilized in our analyses. Last, we specify a conceptual framework, as well as stating 
the hypotheses formally. For a description of the event study method and the econometric 
techniques applied, we refer the reader to Appendix F. 
5.1   Specifying the Abnormal Returns 
The methodology applied in our analyses seeks to capture the value creation associated with 
hedge fund activism (manifesting through the filing of a 13D), through the wealth effects 
identified for target shareholders. As defined in Eckbo (2007) “an event study seeks to establish 
whether the cross-sectional distribution of returns at the time of an event is abnormal (i.e 
systematically different from predicted)”. We identify such wealth effects by collecting 
information regarding the market reaction to the announcement, simplified to the stock price 
reaction of target shares. Hence, it is critical that we are able to attribute the change in the stock 
price solely to the event, and not by other sources of information becoming available at the time 
interval and such affecting valuations. To do this, we first need a definition of a normal return 
expected if the event where not to occur.  
 
In order to calculate the normal returns needed to separate the fraction of realized returns which 
can be accounted for as abnormal, we employ the Fama-French Carhart Four factor model.  The 
pricing model utilizes the Fama-French (FF) Three-factor model (Fama-French, 1993) 
extending it with a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997).  
 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡] = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀 × 𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀 × 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡  (1) 
 
Where  𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡] is the expected (normal) return given the conditioning information (market 
movements, SMB, HML and MOM) at time t, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free return rate,  𝑅𝑀𝑡 is the market 
portfolio risk premium, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, Small Minus Big (market capitalization), accounts for the excess 
return of a portfolio of small cap companies over a corresponding portfolio of large cap 
companies. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, High Minus Low (Book-to-Market ratio) is a zero-cost portfolio long value 
stocks and short growth stocks. The last factor, 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 incorporates the momentum factor, (i.e. 
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the tendency for the movement of a stock’s next direction to be the same as its last direction), 
as a self-financing portfolio long past winner stocks and short past losers.  The betas encapsulate 
the individual stock’s historical movement sensitivity, or factor loadings, towards the 
corresponding factor. An ex-post version of the four-factor model allows for conditional 
prediction of individual stock returns and empirical testing of the four-factor model, by yielding 
a relationship for realized, observed returns. 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡] + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
 
The abnormal return term (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) represents firm specific details affecting returns that are not 
captured and explained through the firm’s sensitivity towards the four factors. Since the 
estimation window is not overlapping the event window, announcement of hedge fund activist 
intervention should by construction not be captured by the four factors, hence be encapsulated 
in the firm-specific, abnormal return term. 
  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡]     (3) 
 
Once the model has been properly calibrated by determining the parameters needed, one can 
accumulate the daily abnormal returns over a desired period under consideration, the event 
window (T1 to T2), to add up the full wealth effect from activist hedge fund intervention. The 
resulting measure is called Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR): 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ~ 𝑁[0, 𝜎𝑖
2(𝑎, 𝑏)]𝑇2𝑇1     (4) 
where  𝜎𝑖
2(𝑎, 𝑏) = (𝑏 − 𝑎 + 1)𝜎𝑒𝑡
2     (5) 
 
Having defined 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 this way, it now represents the returns to firm i not explained by the four-
factor model, hence determined by firm-specific factors like hedge fund activist interventions, 
over the period under consideration. In order to make the CAR data testable, we aggregate over 
our large sample of companies to form averages. By the Central Limit Theorem (Walpole et al. 
2002) we get the sample average CAR 
  
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 ~ 𝑁[0, 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝑁
𝑖=1    (6) 
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5.2   Event Window Determination 
The methodology utilized is adopted in order to elude everyday random influences on stock 
prices and pinpoint the wealth effects originating from the activist hedge fund intervention.  In 
a perfect world, one would obviously want to rule out all news and effects affecting the target 
firm under consideration until the only effect left is that resulting from the hedge fund activist 
involvement. However, as this is virtually impossible to execute practically, we will have to 
lean on the assumption that firm-specific effects on returns are randomly distributed and may 
have either a positive or a negative effect, i.e. letting the law of large numbers work in our 
favor.  As the CARs are corrected for general market information through the four-factor model, 
and later averaged, we would expect effects not related to the activist intervention to be 
negligible in the aggregate over short periods of time. Wider event windows have, however, a 
higher likelihood of capturing effects of randomly generated, firm-specific return shocks.  Thus 
a narrow event window is preferable when considering noise effects. 
 
On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that markets may not be perfectly efficient 
when pricing in activist intervention, i.e. that information may leak (see for example Brav et 
al., 2010 or Klein and Zur, 2008). Hence a wider event window might be preferred to 
encapsulate the complete price effect originating from the activist involvement.  For instance, 
several empirical studies reveal a significant price run-up in the 10-day window prior to 
announcement day (date 0), indicating a leakage of information that activist hedge funds are 
accumulating stocks in a company, kicking off both abnormal trading volumes and returns 
before the “official” announcement date. In addition, markets seem to use a few trading days 
after announcement day to act on, or adjust their reactions, to fully reflect their expectations.  
Taken into account these phenomena, a longer event window is desirable.  Thus, we face a 
trade-off between precision of the estimate and the ability to isolate the effects of the event and 
ability to capture the full effect generated by the activist intervention. We chose event windows 
by an heuristic approach, adjusting it to best fit the particular analyses we execute.  In cases 
where the event-window may have significant impact on the results, we examine alternative 
event windows to test the robustness of our findings. 
 
In addition, when looking at short-term returns, the full wealth effect from a successful activist 
hedge fund campaign will naturally not be reflected in the price immediately. There is always 
a probability that the campaign will end up being unsuccessful. Thus, when looking at short-
5    METHODOLOGY 39 
 
term returns, we are actually looking at the wealth effects of a successful activist campaign 
discounted to adjust for the probability of failure. As activist campaigns are on average long-
term (8-16 months), we also examine the long-term value creation of activist hedge funds (12 
months) to reveal the value creation with ex-post figures, where the probability-weighting 
discount should, on average, be neglected.   Hence, when examining short-term abnormal 
returns, we look at the (-15, +15), (-12, +10) and (-12, +2) event day windows, where date 0 is 
the date of announcement (filing 13D). When addressing long-term abnormal returns, we use 
event windows of (0, +12) months, with date 0 still being the announcement day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: CAR event window summary (blue: in months, grey: in days) 
5.3   Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
As we want to examine the wealth effect on target firm shareholders from activist hedge fund 
intervention both in the short- and long-run, we develop a conceptual framework with a starting 
point in Stokman’s (2007) conceptual model. However, we modify it somewhat to fit our 
hypotheses to a larger extent. 
 
The first effect we want to address is the target firm stock price movements associated with 
activist hedge funds accumulating and announcing significant positions, formally the short-term 
stock price run-up in the days surrounding the announcement day. 
  
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
[-12,+2] days
[-12,+10] days
[-15,+15] days
[0,+12] months
Announcement day d/m
CAR Event Window Summary 
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Figure 13: Effects on short-term abnormal returns in target firms. 
 
Next, we want to examine whether the short-term price run-up is temporary, or whether the 
hedge fund activists actually create longer-term shareholder value. In addition, we want to 
explain the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns across target firms, both short-term 
and long-term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14:  Effects on long-term abnormal returns and cross-sectional differences in abnormal 
returns in target firms 
 
We design numerous hypotheses, and conduct several analyses to examine these effects as 
precise as possible. We have proposed hypotheses and executed analyses within four “research 
blocks”, which, despite being heavily interdependent, are treated separately in this chapter to 
keep conceptual and methodical tidiness.  The four “blocks” are target firm characteristics, 
short-term abnormal returns, long-term abnormal returns and cross-sectional differences in 
abnormal returns. 
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5.3.1   Target Firm Characteristics  
We first want to examine the development in target firm characteristics, and compare the 
characteristics of companies targeted by hedge fund activists to the average company. We 
propose a number of hypotheses: 
 The average target firm market capitalization has become higher over the years, even 
when correcting for inflation and the general growth of the average company on the 
NYSE/Amex-exchange, as seen by activist campaigns covered in media. 
 The Price-to-Book ratios of target firms are on average lower than the P/B-ratio of the 
average NYSE/Amex-company, thus activists target undervalued/low growth 
companies. 
 The EBIT-margin is on average lower in target firms than in non-target firms. The same 
applies to the debt-to-asset-ratio. This should, all else equal, yield larger room for 
improvements and utilization of idle debt capacity. 
 Activist hedge funds are shifting towards targeting companies with higher cash-to-asset-
ratios, even when adjusting for the general increase in cash-to-asset-ratios over time in 
the average NYSE/Amex-company. 
 Activist hedge funds target companies with below-average bid-ask spreads (higher 
liquidity) to ensure quicker exit opportunities and smoother accumulations. 
5.3.2   Short-Term Abnormal Return  
Next, we want to look at the short-term price movements in the target firm stock. 
 There is, on average, a significant abnormal price run-up in the days surrounding 
announcement of activist hedge fund intervention.  
 The short-term abnormal return is not explained solely by abnormal trading volume, but 
by the hedge funds’ expected value impact discounted for the probability of success. 
 The abnormal short-term return is lower in times of economic crisis, than in steady 
economic times, due to decreased demand for stocks and less M&A opportunities for 
targets. 
 The short-term announcement abnormal return is higher for an activist hedge fund with 
a solid and considerable track record (high frequency fund, with more than ten deals on 
their track record) than for an activist hedge fund with insignificant track-record (low 
frequency fund, with less than five deals on their track record). 
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5.3.3   Long-Term Abnormal Returns  
Further, we want to address the potential long-term value creation by activist hedge funds. 
 Target firms earn, on average, a significant 12-month abnormal return, i.e. the activist 
hedge funds are long-term value creators (systematically positive alpha) at the margin, 
and the short-term run-up is not offset by a longer-term decline in stock price. 
 The long-term abnormal return is lower in times of economic crisis, than in steady 
economic times, because of a climate favoring status quo over changes. 
 The long-term abnormal return is higher in firms targeted by high frequency hedge 
funds than in firms targeted by low frequency funds), due to learning effects and 
knowledge accumulation. 
5.3.4   Cross-Sectional Differences in Abnormal Returns 
Lastly, we want to examine what explains the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns, 
by running regressions of 12- month abnormal returns, as well as the short-term abnormal 
returns, on target firm characteristic, hedge fund characteristics, intervention characteristics and 
year dummies. 
 Cross-sectional differences in long-term abnormal returns can be largely explained by 
target firm characteristics (such as accounting and valuation metrics), hedge fund 
characteristics (track record), intervention characteristics (initial stake, stated objective 
and stated tactic) and year-specific dummies. 
 In the target firm, higher cash-to-asset ratio, a lower EBIT-margin (proxy for 
profitability) a lower debt-to-asset ratio and a lower bid-ask spread will, ceteris paribus, 
increase the long-term abnormal return, as they provide greater opportunities for 
improvements. 
 Price-to-book and market capitalization should, all else equal, yield negative but small 
coefficients because the Fama-French framework should have already captured these 
effects through the estimation of normal returns.  
 In the activist hedge fund, a higher initial stake and a solid track record will, ceteris 
paribus, increase abnormal return, because of greater voting power and incentives to 
push for changes. 
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 Regarding the intervention characteristics, we think that a more aggressively stated 
objective and a more hostile stated tactic will decrease the long-term abnormal returns, 
due to the higher costs associated with hostile tactics. 
 The short-term abnormal returns can be partially explained by the long-term abnormal 
return, as the market correctly anticipates the wealth effect of activist intervention. 
 With earlier research in mind, e.g. Greenwood and Schor (2009), we think that the short-
term abnormal returns should be partially explained by the stated objectives.  
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6    Data  
 
Event studies require a large amount of data, and we have spent considerable time and effort 
gathering and structuring ours. The authors recognize that the soundness of our conclusions is 
highly dependent on whether the data is obtained in a reasonable manner. Hence, we devote 
significant time and attention to our data sample; construction, sources utilized, description and 
comparable studies. Further, we will present biases that may influence our study. Lastly, we 
discuss whether our sample will capture the necessary factors needed for our thesis and its 
representativeness for hedge fund activism in general by doing a comparison and benchmark 
analysis to earlier studies.   
6.1   Construction – Gathering and Structuring the Data 
6.1.1   U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Section 13  
Despite not going to give a full overview of SEC, we believe it is important to understand the 
aspect of the filing system related to our thesis since there is no research database covering 
hedge fund activism in full scale. This will give a deeper understanding of both the dataset 
creation, and its limitations. The SEC’s filing system contains “the disclosure of important 
market-related information, maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud”. Hence, we 
can utilize it to gather important information about activist events. We needed a list of 
transactions with identifying information we could use to gather characteristics of targets 
through COMPUSTAT and stock prices from Chicago Research Center in Securities Prices 
(CRSP). To obtain this list, we began with SEC and section 13.  
 
Section 13(D)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires an investor to disclose their 
purchase when acquiring a stake of >5% and the investor has an intention to influence corporate 
control (Brav & Miller, 2014). Furthermore, a large amount of the 13Ds are filed by passive 
investors, who choose to have the option to later engage in activist events. After investors have 
reached the 5% threshold, they have ten days to file. The 13D contains information regarding 
both the investor, his interest in the security (however, this may often yield limited information), 
and the source and amount of funds used. It covers key areas such as the identity of the investor, 
acquired stake, filing date, price paid, and purpose of the transaction. In particular, item 4 of a 
13D requires the filer to declare the reasons for purchasing the shares, particularly if the 
intention is to engage in M&A activity, asset sale, capital structure or dividend policy changes, 
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or propose other types of corporate changes. We subsequently separate the intended actions into 
the following categories: General undervaluation, capital structure, business strategy, sale of 
target company and governance objectives. This is done largely due to the structure of Brav et 
al.’s dataset, as it yields the opportunity to look at time trends and make comparisons. For events 
with limited information in the 13D, we use news searches (Factiva) to obtain necessary 
information. Furthermore, we separate the stated actions of the hedge funds into different tactic 
categories, based on whether they are friendly or hostile in nature. For the interested reader, we 
review Section 13D and its counterpart 13G in depth in Appendix E. 
6.1.2   Merging Datasets – Robin Greenwood and Alon Brav 
As mentioned, Professor Robin Greenwood (Harvard Business School) and Professor Alon 
Brav (Fuqua School of Business) provided us with valuable help and resources during this 
thesis. Regarding their recent work on hedge fund activism, they were able to offer us their 
identified events. Brav’s dataset contains deals from 1994-2011, and Greenwood’s from 1993-
2006. However, their datasets differ significantly due to their difference in research question. 
While Brav’s dataset has been utilized in many different papers, Greenwood’s has not. 
Criticism has been raised towards activist research (Allaire et al., 2014) due to large differences 
in datasets. Therefore, we find it important to cross check and add potential missed filings. 
 
Brav et al.’s dataset contains 2624 events from the 1994-2011 period. Although not utilized in 
a study yet, they gather all SEC filings (13Ds) in the period, and exclude some events where 
the purpose of the transaction is not directly related to hedge fund activism. This includes 
bankruptcy reorganization or the financing of a distressed firm, engagement in M&A risk 
arbitrage or when the target is a closed-end fund or other non-regular businesses (Brav, Jiang 
and Kim, 2010). They further use news search to gather information about motives, responses 
and the development of the deals. Lastly, they locate deals in companies with large market 
capitalizations where the hedge fund has acquired less than 5%. This is done by gathering all 
13F filings (published each quarter and showing all of the hedge funds holdings), and 
identifying companies with market values larger than $1 bn where the ownership of the hedge 
fund is larger than 2%.  See Brav et al.’s Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Performance (2008) for a full description of their dataset.  
 
46 6    DATA 
 
 
Greenwood and Schor’s (2009) dataset is constructed in a different way, because it contains 
both institutional activist engagements as well as hedge funds’ interventions. They merge all 
13D and DFAN14A (definite proxy statements) filings from the SEC database, reducing their 
sample substantially. They subsequently exclude targets that are closed-end funds as well as 
firms unidentified by CRSP, and end up with 980 activist events where 784 is hedge fund unique 
in the time period from the third quarter of 1993 to the third quarter of 2006. 
 
Hence, we cross-check Brav et al.’s and Greenwood and Schor’s datasets, and use the names 
of hedge funds from Brav et al.’s dataset to find potential missed filings. We localize 77 13Ds 
in Greenwood and Schor’s dataset, which we implement into Brav et als.’s, all dated before 
2001. Furthermore, we found one additional hedge fund, not included in Brav et al.’s dataset, 
which had done one deal in 1996. After this session, we are left with a comprehensive dataset 
from 1994 to 2011, containing 2705 deals in total.  
6.1.3   Restricting the Sample 
The number of hedge fund activist events in the period we are seeking to understand is large; 
hence, we have restricted our dataset during the period by allowing our sample to only cover 
certain criteria:  
 
1. Targets listed on American stock exchanges 
There are several reasons as to why we impose such a limitation. First, it avoids the 
differences in regulations by countries. Second, it covers a more similar market 
environment being exposed to similar macroeconomic factors. Even though this may 
lead to somewhat a bias in our interpretation of hedge fund activism in general Bryan et 
al.  (1998) emphasized that 58 of the 100 largest companies ranked by market 
capitalization were American.  Furthermore, Preqin’s Special Report on Hedge Fund 
Activism (2014) notices that 66% of activist funds are headquartered in North America 
and that these funds largely invests in the US. This is confirmed by Activist Insight’s 
“An annual review of trends in shareholder activism” (2014) where they state that 71% 
of publicly targeted companies by activists in 2013 where US companies. Furthermore, 
they have surveyed institutional investors finding that 90% prefers to invest in activist 
funds in North America.  
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2. We exclude events where the intention is bankruptcy reorganization or the financing of 
a distressed firm or engagement in M&A risk arbitrage  
We do this as to not mix objectives of the hedge funds. The nature of the intent and the 
consequence differs largely from those of shareholder activism, in line with Brav et al. 
(2008).  
 
3. Closed-end funds regarded as targets are excluded 
We exclude closed-end funds because they are not regarded as regular corporations, and 
refer the reader interested in activism in closed-end fund to Bradley et al. (2007).  
6.1.4   Extending the Dataset 
We wanted to investigate effects post financial crisis as well; hence, we needed an increased 
time span to get reliable results. Therefore, we collected all filings between 2011 and 2013, 
utilizing PERL coding to download all SC 13Ds in the period following Garcia and Norli’s 
(2012) Crawling Edgar paper. Private Equity companies, corporate raiders and institutional 
investors hold several 13Ds and only approximately 10% of all 13D-filings in 2012 and 2013 
were made by activist hedge funds. Therefore, we employed the text-reading program to 
identify hedge funds. We used all the names in the existing database to find deals from hedge 
funds we had already located. However, there has been a considerable amount of new hedge 
funds coming into play since 2011 (Preqin Special Report, 2014). We use several sources2 to 
identify new activist funds, and include these in our search for additional 13D filings. We added 
12 funds in 2012 and 28 funds in 2013 in line with Preqin’s hedge fund database.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Activist Hedge Fund Launches 
                                                        
2 Activist Insight, Prequin, FactSet Sharkwatch, Bloomberg, SDC Platinum, Factiva news search, The Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG)  
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We consequently add 391 deals for 2012 and 2013 from both hedge funds launched prior to 
2012 and new ones identified in 2012 and 2013. For these years, we hand collect the purpose 
of the transaction, initial stake bought by the hedge fund, and the stated tactic, enabling us to 
do subsample analyses later on.  In total, we are left with 3065 events. 
6.2   Description of the Data Sample  
6.2.1   Potential Biases and Descriptive Statistics  
First, the three restrictions enforced in 6.1.3 require us to test whether we have introduced any 
severe selection biases and hence distorted the true picture of hedge fund activism. Second, the 
usage of COMPUSTAT and CRSP lead to events being dropped due to insufficient accounting 
and stock price information. Third, we may have a bias towards smaller targets due to the nature 
of the SEC filings requirements. We argue, however, that our restrictions and precautions taken 
have helped us avoid the largest pitfalls and yield a representative sample.  
 
The restrictions imposed are explained in detail above in 6.1.3. Furthermore, we find that even 
though COMPUSTAT and CRSP remove events without sufficient information, it does so 
relatively evenly over the sample period. As seen from the graph below, the same distribution 
of missing deals applies over time. Hence, we believe this should rule out any significant bias 
towards more or less profitable periods. 
 
Figure 16: Number of deals by year in analyses 
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As seen, a large number of deals is excluded in the long-term analysis. This is mainly due to 
accounting data missing from COMPUSTAT. However, we are left with over 1000 deals in this 
analysis as well. Moreover, a considerable fraction of the deals in companies with large market 
capitalizations has been done the last years, e.g., Icahn’s stake in Apple, Herbalife and Time 
Warner. Due to the size of these companies, the activists usually acquire significantly less than 
5 percent. This will systematically bias our dataset towards smaller deals. Hence, we believe it 
is necessary to use time and effort to locate deals below the five percent threshold. We employ 
Factiva news search, Prequin’s activist hedge fund database, Activist Insight, SDC Platinum, 
FactSet’s Sharkwatch and sources from The Boston Consulting Group to locate these deals. 
Earlier empirical research (Brav et al., 2008) found only 27 events during the period of 2001 to 
2006. We find 28 additional deals for 2012 and 2013 with an initial stake <5%. Despite not  a 
large number, we believe the process strengthens our dataset and increases its reliability.  
 
Furthermore, the restrictions enforced are chosen both due to Bravet al.’s dataset as well as best 
practices in the hedge fund activism literature. We provide an overview in Appendix B, 
constituting several research papers on hedge fund activism and their selection criteria as well 
as their construction of their datasets.  
 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Empirical Work on the Long-Term Effects of Activist 
Interventions; 2014) criticize Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang’s (2013) latest research arguing that the 
time trend covered (1994-2007) has exaggerated performance. As previously explained we 
investigate a longer time trend covering both periods of crisis (dot-com and the financial crisis), 
and periods when financial markets have experienced tailwinds. Therefore, we are able to cover 
years of both low and high returns, and hence argue that our sample is not biased towards certain 
periods or macroeconomic conditions.  
 
In conclusion, we believe that the construction of the dataset has led to a representative sample 
of the activist hedge fund activity in the U.S.  
6.2.2   Statistical Properties of the Return Data 
As seen from Table 2 the average short-term cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in our sample 
is 6%, and the average long-term CAR is to 25%, both significant at the 1% level. However, as 
the subsequent graphs and table show, the data is somewhat skewed.  
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Return series Short-term Long-term 
Mean 5,74 % 25 % 
(t-stat. p-value) (12,22. 0%) (16,54. 0%) 
   
Standard deviation 22,3 % 49,9 % 
   
Median 5 % 15 % 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test. p-value) (13,05. 0%) (14,40. 0%) 
   
Kurtosis 8,2 5,0 
   
Skewness 0,7 1,2 
   
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality n/a 0,92 
(p-value)  (0%) 
   
Shapiro-Francia W test for normality 0,93 0,92 
(p-value) (0%) (0%) 
   
N 2702 1102 
 
Table 2: Statistical properties of the return data 
 
Even though the t-test can be interpreted as robust, and with large sample sizes will yield correct 
conclusions according to the central limit theorem3, we list the median value for both short-
term and long-term CAR. We accompany the value with a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
indicating statistical significant values different from zero. The table also provides us with 
indication of skewness, especially for long-term CARs, as the median is left of the mean. This 
is indicative of positive skewness, which increases the mean in the data. We however find that 
it does not bias the results significantly. First, the median is still significantly different from 
zero. Second, based on the large deviation in long-term CARs, we argue that the median does 
not deviate too much from the mean.  
 
We show the distribution of both short-term CARs and long-term CARs and the cumulative 
distribution frequency in the following graphs.  
  
                                                        
3 See Appendix F for details 
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Figure 17: Distribution of short-term and long-term CARs 
6.2.3   Comparison to Other Studies for Short-Term Abnormal Returns 
We perform a detailed review of existing literature related to hedge fund activism and event 
studies. A fairly large part of our analysis and interpretations have been devoted to understand 
limitations and criticism of earlier studies as well as to explain the large differences. This 
includes short time series, low number of deals, and too long/short event windows potentially 
capturing effects not related to the event analyzed. We have made a significant effort trying to 
avoid these pitfalls in this study. 
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Figure 18: Short-term Returns Review – Comparison Analysis 
 
There is a clear pattern, where we suggest that the bottom percentile of studies find low returns 
because they fail to capture the run up in the ten days prior to the filing. Further, the upper 
percentile of studies struggles with either a small sample size or a long-event window 
potentially capturing effects outside the relevant event. The only exception is Klein and Zur 
(2009)’s CAR at 5.7%. However, we find that the average CAR in 2003-2005 are close to the 
overall average. Hence, their results may simply reflect their utilized time period. In conclusion, 
we argue our short-term returns could be representative for hedge fund activism.  For the long-
term analysis, a similar comparison may be a bit biased due to the reasons mentioned in the 
literature review. 
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7    Descriptive Statistics and Target Firm Characteristics  
 
We have examined the trends of activist investing, and unveiled some shifts in its features and 
the target firm characteristics during the last years. This chapter is organized by first 
investigating the general development of number of deals and the size of the companies 
targeted. Subsequently, by studying the profitability, leverage ratios, liquidity and valuation 
metrics of the companies. Lastly, by explaining the shift in objectives by the hedge funds. We 
aim to uncover potential patterns in the development in target firm characteristics, and the 
rationale for targeting companies with particular features; this will yield a sound understanding 
of potential variables to include in later analyses.   
7.1   Number of Deals and Market Capitalization 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Number of activist events by year (full sample)  
 
Burkart and Dasgupta (2013) find that hedge fund activism is largely procyclical. Figure 19 
shows that that activist events are regaining in volume since the financial crisis, which was felt 
most profoundly in 2009 for the funds. Several activists experienced withdrawal of money from 
their funds, and their assets under management decreased significantly leading to a lagged effect 
of the deal activity. Capital markets collapsed and investors shifted towards more liquid assets. 
The founder of Bulldog Investments expressed it as “being in the store where everything is 80% 
off but you have just $2 in your pocket” (Cheffins and Armour, 2011). However, times are 
changing, and 2013 was the year when the activists had the most funds available under their 
management, during the last decade. As an example, JANA Partners saw its asset under 
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management increase by $3bn last year alone (Activist Insight, 2014). This is also reflected in 
the size of the target companies, developing in line with funds available:   
 
 
Figure 20: Assets under management and no. of events in targets with market cap >1bn USD 
 
Furthermore, we see that the number of hedge funds dropped significantly during the last crisis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Number of activist hedge funds in our sample 
 
As shown by the figures, in times of crisis (dot-com and the financial crisis) the funds target on 
average smaller companies and this effects tends to last a year after. Even though the market 
capitalization of all companies shrink, we see that the effect of less funding available, combined 
with tougher conditions with respect to changes in the companies, outweighs the former. The 
number of deals has not returned to pre-financial crisis levels, but the activists have a broader 
choice of targets. Even though market capitalization in general will increase over time, the 
difference is explained by the increase in funds available for the activists more than larger 
market capitalizations in general.  
0
18
36
54
72
90
108
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Assets Under Management (USD bn) 
Source: JP Morgan, Hedge Fund Research 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Number of Targets with Market Cap >1bn USD 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Development of Number of Activist Hedge Funds in our Sample 
7    DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND TARGET FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 55 
 
Figure 22: Market Capitalization development in sample versus NYSE/AMEX 
 
We show that the size of the smallest targets has not changed much, but there is a significant 
larger spread in the size of the targets, indicating a larger choice of targets (boxplot in Appendix 
C).  
 
Furthermore, the number of companies worth more than $10 bn that were targeted by hedge 
fund activists in 2013 was almost twice the number in 2012. Beyond increased funds, this may 
also be attributed both to the reputation of some of the activists as well as their ability to enhance 
voting rights at low costs. First, high frequency activists, such as Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman’s 
Pershing Square, have gained a significant reputation over the last years from increased 
attention in media. For example, the “13D Activist Fund” is a mutual fund investing solely in 
activist targets. In addition, headlines in the Wall Street Journal have several times included 
Icahn’s and other activists’ names. Furthermore, we see that the largest targets are targeted by 
“high frequency funds”.  
7.2   Target Firm Characteristics   
Historically, most funds using activism as its main investment strategy have targeted companies 
with poor performance relative to peers (Gillan and Starks, 2007). When looking at the target 
companies isolated, we see that the funds now target companies with above average EBIT-
margins. 
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EBIT margin Compared to Historical Average 
  
Figure 23: EBIT margin for target firms versus historical average 
 
However, compared to the universe of companies (NYSE/AMEX) we see that the target 
companies are still underperforming their peers, and that the shift towards higher operating 
profits is a general trend.   
Figure 24: EBIT margin for target firms versus NYSE/AMEX 
 
Further, we see a change in the targets’ cash holdings. Looking only at cross-sectional data, we 
see that compared to the historical average, the most recent deals are targeting companies with 
more cash, expressed by the cash-to-assets ratio.  
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Figure 25: Cash-to-assets ratio for target firms versus historical average 
 
Further, the increase in number of targets with higher cash-ratios cannot only be explained by 
companies in general accumulating more cash. We find that the companies targeted the last 
decade or so have held cash balances above the median of NYSE/AMEX companies, 
contradicting Zhu (2013) who’s time trend only lasts through 2007 (see table 1 in literature 
review). This is largely in line with the change of investment objectives, where more activists 
indicate buybacks and capital structure changes to reduce the agency costs of cash (Jensen, 
1986). According to Jensen (1986), companies are able to reduce agency problems between 
shareholders and management by reducing excess cash balances. 
 
Figure 26: Cash-to-assets ratio for target firms versus NYSE/AMEX 
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This increase in the cash-to-assets ratio is also reflected somewhat through the debt ratios of 
the target companies, showing lower debt ratios than the average U.S. company and hence 
indicating a much lower net leverage level. With an increased focus on capital structure, it is 
easy to see that gearing up the debt levels of the targets should be possible. Our finding of lower 
leverage ratios among target firms contradict Boyson and Mooradian (2007) and Klein and Zur 
(2009), who find no significant differences in leverage ratios of target firms. It is, however, in 
line with both Brav et al. (2010) and Zhu (2013) using over twice the number of events 
compared to Boyson and Mooradian (2007) and Klein and Zur (2009). 
 
Figure 27: Debt-to-assets ratio for target firms versus historical average 
 
Even though the activists target companies with lower debt ratios compared to the historical 
average, it is interesting to see that they have always been targeting companies with low 
leverage ratios compared to the average U.S company. The subsequent graph illustrates this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Debt-to-assets ratio for target firms versus NYSE/AMEX  
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7.3   Trading Data – Liquidity and Discounts 
We find that the stocks of companies targeted was earlier characterized by larger bid-ask 
spreads, a proxy we use for illiquidity. We find that the spread has shrunk significantly. Even 
though it may also indicate that capital markets generally have become more efficient, we find 
that the active funds now target companies that are significantly (at 5% level) more liquid than 
the average and median NYSE/AMEX company. This may be due to several factors. First, a 
larger focus from investors in the funds on exit opportunities. Second, it allows the fund to 
easier increase its share without imposing a penalty on itself in the run-up period. Finally, it 
allows the fund to accumulate shares quicker, without having a share price impact. 
.  
Figure 29: Bid-ask spread for target companies versus NYSE/AMEX (See Appendix C for 
boxplot diagram of Bid-Ask spread development.) 
 
Furthermore, a large part of the empirical literature has shown that companies targeted have 
low valuation metrics compared to peers, often measured by price-to-book or market-to-book 
ratios. We show that this has been the case since 1994, by measuring the P/B of NYSE/AMEX 
companies against the target companies’ ratios. 
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Figure 30: P/B for target firms versus NYSE/AMEX 
7.4   Change in Investment Objectives 
Regarding hedge funds interventions, we have categorized the events into five blocks. From 
Brav et al.’s dataset (1994-2011), we have only an aggregated value, and no separation per deal. 
For deals from Greenwoods dataset merged into ours, we hand collect the purpose of those 
transactions to be able to aggregate numbers. We further hand collect the objectives from 2012 
and 2013, with the purpose of making a more detailed regression analysis for this sample. The 
total value will add up to more than 100%, as the hedge fund may list intentions towards more 
objectives than one. However, the first category, “general undervaluation” is exclusive. The 
collection of objectives for 2012 and 2013 enables us to spot potential significant time trends.  
 
Objectives Undervaluation Capital structure Business Strategy Sale  Governance 
      
2012-2013 49.4 % 25.9 % 25.9 % 13.3 % 23.4 % 
      
1994-2011 59.7 % 12.8 % 17.8 % 15.3 % 31.0 % 
      
Recent - Old -10.1 % 13.2 % 8.1 % -1.9 % -7.6 % 
 
Table 3: Relative frequency of investment objectives, and its change over time 
 
The differences in targeting “Undervaluation” and “Capital Structure” are significant, 
indicating a clear shift in investment objective regarding these two categories, in opposite 
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directions. The decline in undervaluation may simply be attributed to more specific 13Ds or 
more in-depth research on each deal by the separate researchers.  
 
Figure 31: Changes in investment objectives for 2012-2013 versus 1994-2011 
 
We believe the mentioned characteristics and graphs indicate the types of companies targeted 
by activists: poor performers with large cash balances and low debt ratios trading at discount to 
their peers. First, we find that activists also target larger companies than historically. They are 
still targeting small companies, but the spread in size is significantly increasing, yielding a 
larger diversity of targets.  Second, the companies are underperformers compared to their peers, 
indicated by a substantially lower EBIT-margin. One could potentially argue that our sample is 
too sector specific to compare against a whole index’s average and median values. However, 
we find that the spread of industries is large in our sample (more than 800 4-digit SIC-codes of 
a total of 1005 according to Siccode.com), hence we do not believe that activists are biased 
towards less profitable industries. Even if they were, it is still of interest to see the “typical” 
company invested in by the activists. Third, we find that the targets have significantly larger 
cash-to-assets ratio than their counterparts at NYSE/AMEX. This has also changed since the 
beginning of the millennium, with activists before 2002 mostly targeting companies with 
significantly lower amount of cash than peers. Fourth, target companies experience 
significantly lower debt-to-asset ratios.  Cross-sectional analysis shows they have not varied 
much with the largest difference being 8% throughout our sample years. However, the 
difference to the NYSE/AMEX is economically meaningful by indicating a potential for 
financial engineering, in line with many funds’ objectives listed as capital structure related. 
Fifth, we find that they have changed towards investing in more liquid stocks. Last, most target 
companies are undervalued (or have lower growth outlooks) compared to peers, manifested 
through the fact that hedge funds are targeting firms with significantly lower P/B-ratios than 
the average U.S. company.    
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8    Short-Term Abnormal Returns  
 
The essential question for activism is whether it is able to create value for shareholders. 
Moreover, how the stock market perceives the effect of the activists. We investigate the effect 
both for a short-term and long-term horizon. The following three chapters are structured in the 
following manner: First, we look at short-term event windows and investigate the overall value 
creation as well as time trends. Subsequently we investigate the effect of business circle 
downturns on abnormal returns and thereafter look at the differences between high frequency 
funds and low frequency funds.  Second, we use calendar-time portfolio regression approach to 
investigate whether mimicking the activist hedge funds has traditionally been a sound 
investment strategy, enabling investors to capture alphas. We use long-term event windows to 
investigate whether the effect of value creation is sustained over a longer horizon and not just 
overreaction in markets. Third, we model the long-term and short-term abnormal returns as a 
function of target firm characteristics, hedge fund characteristics, intervention characteristics 
and macroeconomic conditions; using a cross-sectional regression analysis to estimate a 
prediction model for abnormal returns.  
 
Our sample of activist hedge funds documents large positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. We use the analysis around short-term event windows  not only to look at 
the overall value creation in the sample, but also to investigate periods of headwinds and 
tailwinds  in the overall economy, and further distinguish between high frequency funds and 
low frequency funds.  
8.1   Short-Term Value Creation  
We adopt daily event windows of (-12,2), (-12,10) and (-15,15). The event date (t=0) is defined 
as the 13D filing date, formally the announcement date. The most important reason to include 
a significant negative time span is to include the run-up period. When crossing the 5 percent 
threshold, the investors have a 10-day window to file the 13D, and we find a run-up consistent 
with information leakage before the announcement. Figure 32 plots the CAR against the 
abnormal trading volume in the (-12,10) daily event window.  
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Figure 32: CAR vs. Abnormal volume, short-term 
 
There is a run-up of about 2.5% before t=0, which we attribute to leakage in the ten day filing 
window after crossing the 5% threshold (t-10). It could, naturally, also be accounted for by 
demand, pushing the prices upwards. However, in our sample, the average 13D is filed close to 
ten days after crossing the 5% threshold. We further argue that the run-up is not attributed to 
further accumulation of shares by the hedge fund itself, as Bebchuk et al. (2013) finds that there 
is no significant increase in stake after crossing the threshold (t-10). The total CAR for the event 
window is 5.74%. CAR is somewhat lower (4.6%) for the (-12,2) window due to excluding 
significant values after t+2. We find that values in the (+2,+10) window are significant at the 
1% level, which may indicate that the market uses some time to price in the event, or that other 
information that distorts the window comes into play. Interestingly, when looking at the event 
windows isolated, we find that days after t+10 are insignificant and hence not distinguishable 
from zero. Therefore, we choose to put emphasis on the (-12,10) window. We believe that 
5.74% is a valid number in our overall value creation analysis in the short-term event window. 
The stock prices reflect the present value of profits introduced by the activist hedge fund, 
adjusted for the expected probability that the fund actually succeeds in its objectives. The graph 
also introduces the aspect of abnormal volume, defined as “the share turnover rate over the 
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“normal” turnover rate measured over the [−100,−40] window preceding the event date” (Brav 
et al., 2010). There may be a couple of explanations to this pattern. First, we may observe wolf-
pack tactics, where several hedge funds who not formally coordinate, buy into the target 
simultaneously. Second, “tipping” may occur, where the hedge fund exposes its intention to 
some investors before the public filing for reciprocation of other favors (Brav et al., 2010).  
8.2   Time Trends and Patterns in Value Creation - Headwinds and Tailwinds  
In figure 33, we break the short-term CAR into event years, to analyze potential time trends. 
We illustrate for both the (-12, +10) and (-12, +2) event day windows. The blue line represents 
the median and the bars represent the average values. Highlighted areas indicate periods of 
economic crisis. 
 
Figure 33: CAR structured by year - top (-12, +10) window, bottom (-12, +2) window 
 
We see that in periods of crisis (less severe in the dot-com crisis, as our sample does not contain 
many tech-related stocks targeted during the dot-com bubble burst), both the average and the 
median short-term CAR experienced a significant drop. From March 2000 until October 2002 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Per Year 
8    SHORT-TERM ABNORMAL RETURNS 65 
 
Nasdaq Composite lost 78% of its value (Bloomberg). Even though IT-related stocks 
experienced the largest slump, it also affected stock markets in general. In our sample, stocks 
with SIC-codes in the IT universe experienced the largest hits on abnormal returns. Most 
abnormal returns rebounded in late 2002 increasing the overall year effect. Furthermore, we 
find in our sample, that during the burst, not many IT stocks were targeted either. During the 
financial crisis, all industries experienced a significant decline in abnormal returns.  
 
We have a somewhat different perception than Brav et al.’s review (2010), due to their shorter 
sample period for abnormal returns. They investigate the year effect during mid 2000, and find 
a decline towards 2007. They interpret this as increased competition reducing the hedge fund 
activists’ “arbitrage” strategy. Focusing on median values, this may seem correct. However, we 
see that due to the limited time series investigated, they may over interpret results in a 
downward cycle, which subsequently seems to have been rebounding both with respect to 
average and median values the last years.  
 
Furthermore, we test the difference between times of crisis and economically stable times. We 
do this analysis both including only stocks listed at NASDAQ and stocks with SIC codes related 
to IT, as well as for all stocks in the time period of the dot-com bubble. For the financial crisis, 
we include all events during the time period. CAR in crisis yield an average (median) value of 
3.1% (4.3%). This is low, compared to the non-crisis value of 6.3% (5.1%). We find that the 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level and economically meaningful. 
 
 
Figure 34: CAR in crisis (blue) vs. economically stable periods (grey) 
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There may be several reasons for why this happens. First, in times of crisis, the run-up isolated 
day-by-day is not statistically significantly different from 0, indicating that there is less demand 
pressure towards the stocks. This might imply less leakage during financial crisis, or that 
markets do not act on the information leaked. Hence, the total CAR will be pulled downwards. 
Second, M&A activites is usually more difficult to execute in times of crisis, making it hard to 
achieve the historically most favored objectives for activist hedge funds (Greenwood and Schor; 
2009). Furthermore, companies are often reluctant to enhance leverage and reduce cash 
balances in times of crisis, making it harder to lever up target firms.  
8.3   High Frequency Funds – Able to Create Additional Value?  
We further investigate the effect of hedge funds’ track record, where we define a high frequency 
fund (hereafter HFF) as a hedge fund activist who have executed more than 10 deals during the 
period, benchmarked against a low frequency fund (hereafter LFF) that have completed less 
than 5 deals. We find average (median) values for HFFs to be 5.6% (4.4%) against LFF values 
of 6.4% (5.5%) when looking at the time period of 1994-2013. The difference between the 
groups is, however, insignificant. A noteworthy bias in this method of comparing comes from 
the fact that the HFFs’ first deals were not “high frequency”-deals, as they had not accumulated 
any learning effects yet, neither gained any reputation through a track record.  Hence, we 
maximize the differences between HFFs and LFFs by looking at funds able to survive the 
financial crisis, and investigate whether we find any time trends. We find that HFFs have 
significantly (5%) higher post-crisis CAR compared to the 1994-2013 average, while LFFs 
post-crisis CAR has insignificantly decreased compared to the 1994-2013 average. The 
difference in differences is statistically significant. These results might suggest a potential 
learning/reputational effect. Comparing the post-crisis figures of HFFs and LFFs, we find the 
HFF average (median) value of 6.9% (4.4%) against LFF value of 6.0% (3.1%). However, the 
difference is still insignificant at the 5% level.  
  
Figure 35: Average CAR for HFFs vs LFFs (grey; 1994-2013) (blue; after the crisis) 
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Lastly, we investigate whether there are any differences in the run-up period (-10, -1). We find 
that there is a large, statistically significant difference at the 5% level, which is also 
economically meaningful.   
 
Figure 36: Run-up (-10,-1) for HFFs (blue) vs. LFFs (grey) 
 
While the HFF run-up is significant at the 0.1% level, the LFFs’ is significant at the 10% level. 
We believe there are some reasons as to why the run-up periods degenerate differently. One 
hypothesis relates to a larger accumulation of shares by HFFs compared to LFFs. However, we 
find that they, in fact, acquire a statistically significant lower stake than LFFs (1% level). This 
is also in line with Boyson and Mooradian (2011) who find that average maximum percentage 
of shares held by LFFs are significantly higher (at the 10% level or better) than for HFFs. Hence, 
we cannot attribute the difference to accumulation of shares. We may however relate the 
difference to reputational matters. We find research companies (such as NPEC) tracking funds 
investing in companies that HFFs invest in, indicating that these funds are more closely 
monitored and hence could be more interesting when leakage appears. Also, monitoring 
increases the probability of leakage. Furthermore, HFFs could be using wolf pack tactics, or 
leak information to other investors for later reciprocation of favors, to a greater extent than 
LFFs. 
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8.4   Concluding Remarks for Short-Term Analyses 
Our findings suggest that activist hedge fund interventions in general are well perceived by the 
stock market, finding average cumulative abnormal returns of 5.74% in the (-12, +10) event 
window. The CAR is higher in economically stable times, and decreases in times of crisis. 
Furthermore, we find that HFFs have performed in line with LFFs, but have shown significant 
signs of improvement over the last years. Lastly, we find a significant difference in their run-
ups. For HFFs, 57% of their total CAR is accounted for during the (-10,-1) window, while LFF 
CAR in the same window is not statistically significantly different from zero. For the analysis 
regarding the cross-sectional differences in short-term abnormal returns, we refer the reader to 
chapter 10. 
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9    Long-Term Abnormal Returns  
 
Our short-term return analyses yielded results showing a significant, and positive, short-term 
return in the stock of the target firms in the days surrounding the announcement day [-12, 10]. 
To examine whether the run-up is driven by buying pressure on the particular stock, we also 
conducted an analysis on abnormal trading volumes. We found no reversal in abnormal returns 
even when the abnormal trading volume declined to figures significantly indistinguishable from 
zero. These results implied that the short-term abnormal return reflect the conditional value 
creation from activist intervention, discounted to account for the probability of that the hedge 
fund will succeed, rather than being caused by abnormal trading volumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Probability discounted CAR; blue (grey) CAR|success (prob. discounted CAR) 
9.1    Long-Term Calendar-Time Monthly Portfolio Regression  
To more formally assess the value creation, and hence long-term returns in the target firms, we 
conduct a calendar-time monthly portfolio regression around the event date. This methodology 
is used to conduct a long-term event study and is also called the alpha approach. The basic idea 
of the approach is to construct a value-weighted rolling portfolio of firms for which the event 
of interest, namely the filing of the SC 13D by an activist hedge fund, has occurred. The 
approach replicate a trading strategy where the investor mimic the activist hedge funds by 
buying stocks in a company when a SC 13D is filed, holding the stock in the rolling portfolio 
for a particular amount of time before exiting completely from the position.  We hold each 
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exiting it. We set the event period to (0, +12) months, as the average holding period is 
approximately 12 months (Brav et al., 2010). Further, we define the risk-adjusted abnormal 
return earned by this portfolio as the portion of the portfolio’s realized return not explained by 
a risk-factor model used to predict normal returns.  For each unique portfolio we estimate a 
regression of the portfolio returns on the Fama-French three factor model (market, size and 
book-to-market), which uses a three-month estimation window, not overlapping the event 
window. We utilize a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) regression, in order to account 
for potential biases arising from endogeneity, and achieve estimators which are consistent, 
asymptotically normal and efficient.  From the regression, we focus on the intercept, which is 
the estimate for alpha, i.e. the monthly, risk-adjusted excessive returns earned by hedge fund 
targets. 
 
We run several regressions, first on the whole sample of events, and then on different sub-
samples to unveil potential patterns. The results are reported in full in table 4. We first conduct 
the test for all the events in our sample, ranging in time from 1994 to 2013, to test whether 
activist hedge funds have systematically earned long-term, risk adjusted excessive returns, i.e. 
created value for target firm shareholders. The alpha for the whole sample is 0.66%, implying 
a positive, monthly, risk-adjusted excessive return. The results are statistically and 
economically significant, and indicate that activist hedge funds consistently have created long-
term abnormal returns for target firm shareholders.  
 
To unveil potential differences in value creation by activist hedge funds in times of economic 
crisis and times with “steady” financial markets, we execute the same test on subsamples called 
“crisis”, in which we include companies significantly affected by the dot.com-crisis (mainly 
tech stocks) and events taking place during the financial crisis, and “non-crisis” where we 
include all remaining events.  We find that 12-months abnormal returns in times of crisis are in 
fact higher than in non-crisis, however; the crisis alpha is only significant at a 10% level. These 
findings are somewhat counterintuitive, as literature states that the most profitable strategy 
exercised by activist hedge funds is a sale of the target companies, which should, intuitively be 
harder to execute in times of crisis, due to unfavorable financial markets. The findings may 
reflect the fact that since executing changes in target firms (relating to governance, capital 
structure, business strategy etc.) is harder in economic downturns, as markets are overwhelmed 
by distrust and generally favor status quo, only the most profitable changes are executed. While 
in normal times, also less profitable (but still profitable) changes are carried through. Another 
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possible explanation may be that market conditions have changed before the exit of the activists. 
Our results are statistically significant, and indicate that activist hedge funds systematically 
create long-term shareholder value, unaffected by the mood of the financial markets. 
 
We also examine whether HFFs are able to create more value than LFFs. To account for the 
effect that the first deals of the HFFs are in fact comparable to deals done by LFFs, we include 
only events which have taken place in 2011-13. This is to take into consideration the fact that 
it takes time to accumulate both reputation and knowledge, thus the first deals done by HFFs 
are in fact nothing different than deals done by LFFs. Even when making this adjustment, to 
maximize the practical differences between HFFs and LFFs, we find that LFFs are actually 
earning larger long-term abnormal returns than HFFs, even though both create significant long-
term abnormal returns for target firm shareholders.  The difference between them is, however, 
not significantly distinguishable from zero.  These results are somewhat in contrast to Boyson 
and Mooradian (2011), who find that only high-frequency activist hedge funds are able to create 
long-term abnormal returns. However, we emphasize that both their dataset, classification of 
hedge funds and time frame differ somewhat from ours. One simple reason for the apparent 
LFF outperformance in our sample may be the higher (-10,-1) day HFF CAR (see chapter 8.3) 
which does not show up in this analysis, as it considers abnormal returns in the (0,+12) month 
window. Another possible explanation may be a systematic investment “tilting” towards 
particular years. To investigate this, we compare the relative frequency of deals done by HFFs 
and LFFs for each of the years in our sample, to see whether some of the sub-samples 
systematically “tilt” their investments towards years more profitable than others. 
 
Figure 38: Relative distribution of HFF and LFF deals done by year.  
Relative Distribution of Deals Done HFF vs LFF 
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An interesting observation from this analysis is the high relative frequency of deals done by 
LFFs in 2007 and 2008, relative to HFFs. As our analysis on crisis versus non-crisis indicated 
higher alphas in times of crisis, this “tilt” from LFFs towards the years of crisis (2007 and 2008) 
may, at least to some extent, explain the apparent (but not statistically significant) 
outperformance by LFFs. If we conclude that the HFF and LFF alpha are statistically 
inseparable, the low-frequency hedge funds’ tilt towards “more profitable” years, might explain 
why the LFFs are keeping track with the HFFs. Hence, Boyson and Mooradian’s (2008) 
opposite results could be due to the fact that they do not include the LFFs’ most profitable 
period, namely 2008. 
 
The results, overall, point in the same direction; activist hedge funds are able to create long-
term, risk-adjusted excessive returns for target firm shareholders. The results are both 
statistically and economically significant. The findings are consistent with the results from our 
short-term analyses which indicated that the short-term price run-up in target firms is due to a 
probability-weighted incorporation of the potential value-creation from activist intervention, 
rather than from abnormal trading volumes. In addition, the results may give us the reasons for 
why activist hedge funds have survived for more than 20 years and 2 economic crises. First, 
they are able to create long-term abnormal returns unconditional of the market segment. 
Second, they are still creating long-term abnormal returns (looking at the sub-samples from 
2011-13), thus they are still exceeding their expectations regarding returns. Our conclusion is 
in line with Brav et al. (2010), namely that the statistical evidence clearly refutes the market-
overreaction hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that hedge fund activism creates value for 
shareholders. 
 
 
The estimates and t-statistics are from equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio regressions using a [0, +12] event window. The Beta is the factor 
loading on the market excess return, while SMB and HML are the estimates of factor loading on the Fama-French size and book-to-market 
factors.  The Alpha is the estimated intercept from the regression, and show the monthly, risk-adjusted excessive returns earned by the rolling 
target-firm portfolios.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
Table 4: Calendar-time portfolio regression  
Fama-French Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression, Value Weighted Index 
Events included
(year) Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat adj R²
All Events (1994-2013) 0,660*** 2,53 0,964*** 13,18 0,664*** 6,52 0,376*** 3,46 70,16 %
Non-Crisis 0,720*** 2,52 0,905*** 11,59 0,641*** 6,01 0,298** 2,24 67,37 %
Crisis 1,950* 1,37 1,081*** 5,40 0,764** 1,85 0,427* 1,48 48,38 %
Specialists (2011-13) 0,762*** 2,55 0,694*** 4,84 1,234*** 3,67 0,017 0,09 78,70 %
Non-Specialists (2011-13) 1,204** 2,17 0,588*** 3,53 0,515* 1,44 0,072 0,16 51,04 %
Monthly Alpha (%) Beta SMB HML
[0, +12]
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10    Explaining the Cross-Sectional Differences in Abnormal Returns 
 
We have examined and suggested that activist hedge funds are able to create significant positive 
abnormal returns both in the short- and long-run, and hence act as value enhancers for target 
firm shareholders, also at a risk-adjusted level. We now put the cross-sectional differences in 
long-term abnormal returns (LTARs) and short-term abnormal returns (STARs) under the 
scrutiny. The LTARs are still defined as the abnormal returns in the monthly (0, +12) window, 
while STARs are defined as the abnormal returns in the daily (-12, +10) window. This chapter 
tries to reveal potential factors explaining the in-sample variation in LTARs and STARs. 
Basically, we are testing for a relationship between LTARs/STARs in activist hedge fund 
targets and characteristics regarding accounting and stock-price data (Target Firm 
Characteristics), the hedge fund track-record (Hedge fund Characteristics), the stated objective, 
tactic and initial stake of the intervention (Intervention Characteristics) as well as year-specific 
dummy-variables (Macroeconomic Characteristics) (see figure 14 in chapter 5.3). In addition, 
we include the LTARs as an explanatory variable to explain the STARs. This is to see whether 
the market correctly anticipates and price in the gains from activist intervention already in the 
days around announcement. The chapter is organized by first examining the cross sectional 
differences in LTARs, before considering the STARs. As mentioned, we have intervention 
characteristics specified per deal only for 2012 and 2013, hence, an inevitably large number of 
observations is dropped when we include these in some of the regressions.  
10.1   Cross-Sectional Differences in LTARs 
We conduct six unique OLS-regressions, of which in all the dependent variable is long-term 
abnormal return in the activist hedge fund target firm. We follow a stepwise regression model 
proposed by Walpole et al. (2000). The LTARs are again computed from the realized 12-month 
return reduced with a “normal return” yielded by the Carhart four-factor model (FF three-factor 
model in addition to a momentum factor).  Each LTAR is matched with the corresponding target 
firm characteristics, hedge fund characteristics, intervention characteristics and year specific 
variable. In addition, we conduct two unique logit regressions, where the dependent variable is 
a dummy variable equaling 1 if the corresponding LTAR is positive (the results of the logit 
regressions are given in Appendix G). Before examining the regressions and yielded results, we 
find a shallow discussion of the independent variables included necessary.  
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10.1.1   Regressors 
Target firm characteristics 
We collect accounting data (from Compustat) and stock-price data (from CRSP) on the targets 
in the sample on the last available date in the fiscal year prior to the deal year (maximum one 
year lag), as we want the target firm characteristics to be unaffected by the activist event.   
 
“Cash-to-Assets” is calculated as cash and equivalents (incl. short-term investments) divided 
by the total assets of the target firm. “Debt-to-Assets” is the total debt divided by the total assets 
in the target firm. “EBIT-margin” is the target firm earnings before interest and taxes, divided 
by the total revenues. “P/B” is the price-to-book ratio, found by dividing the price per share on 
the equity book value per share. “Mcap” is the market capitalization of the target firm, 
calculated by multiplying the share price by the total shares outstanding. “Bidask” is the bid-
ask spread of the target firm stock. As we consider the bid-ask spread as proxy for illiquidity, 
we expect the coefficient to be negative. 
 
Hedge fund characteristics 
“HighF” (“MediumF”) is a dummy variable equal to one if the particular deal is made by a 
hedge fund classified as a high-frequency (medium-frequency) hedge fund, i.e. having more 
than 10 (between 5 and 10) deals on its track-record.  We leave the low-frequency hedge funds 
(with less than 5 deals on their track record) out of the regression as a reference group. Note 
that a hedge fund cannot change type over time, thus a hedge fund with ten deals on its track 
record will be classified as high-frequency on all deals. 
 
Intervention characteristics 
“Capstruc”, “Strategy”, “Sale” and “Gover” are all dummy variables equaling one if the 
stated objective in the SC 13D is targeting the capital structure, business strategy, a sale of the 
company and corporate government issues respectively. Events where the stated objective is to 
just profit from general stock price appreciation (undervaluation) are left out of the regressions 
as a reference group. We classify the objectives in the same way as Brav et al. (2010), operating 
with four distinct categories, in addition to the more general “undervaluation”-category. 
Objectives targeting payout and leverage policy are lumped into the capital structure-category. 
The business strategy-category includes events where the activist hedge funds target operational 
efficiency, restructurings, M&A activity and growth strategies. The “sale” category are the 
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events where the activists are attempting to force a sale of the target company or acquire it 
themselves. The last category, contains events where the corporate governance is targeted 
(change board composition, remove takeover defenses etc.).“Friendly” is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the stated tactic is of a friendly nature. These are events where the stated method 
of executing activism involves mainly communication and cooperation with the board and 
management of the target firm.  The opposite events are events classified as hostile, and include 
events where the activist investors aim to use public criticism, proxy threats, proxy fights and 
suits.“Stake” is the initial stake taken by the activist hedge funds in the target company, as 
reported in the SC 13D. 
 
One point worth emphasizing regarding the intervention characteristics is that our objective and 
tactic variables are on an ex-ante basis, meaning that these are the initial stated objectives of 
the hedge funds. I.e. we have no guarantee that a company that was originally targeted with the 
purpose of an outright sale, was actually sold. This, in turn, means that our results are not 
directly comparable to studies looking at ex-post objectives (see e.g. Greenwood & Schor, 
2009), i.e. companies that were actually sold. This report, however, is aiming to uncover 
characteristics which can contribute to “predict” the long-term abnormal value creation in the 
target firms, thus the ex-ante objectives/tactics fits our study to a much larger extent. 
10.1.2   Econometric Pitfalls 
In the process of executing OLS-regressions, there are some pitfalls to be aware of and 
potentially avoid when trying to obtain unbiased and efficient estimators. Due to the 
characteristics of our dataset, we particularly check for heteroscedasticity and multicollineraity. 
Heteroscedasticity 
We formally test our sample for heteroscedasticity by conducting a White test (White, 1980) 
looking for general evidence of an association between the variance of the disturbance term and 
the regressors. The test indicate weak evidence of heteroscedasticity in our sample, thus we 
utilize heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in all of our regressions, leaving us with 
unbiased standard errors and asymptotically valid t-tests. In addition, we take the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalization (ln(mcap)) and price-to-book ratio (lnpb) to avoid further 
problems with heteroscedasticity in model 2(7) through 6(12). The same transformation cannot 
be applied to the debt-to-asset ratio, the cash-to-asset ratio nor the EBIT-margin as they can 
take values negative and equal to 0. 
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Multicollinearity 
To formally detect the potential multicollinearity we examine the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and Tolerance of each of the regressors. The results are reported in the table below. 
 
    Variable VIF Tolerance 
    Ln(mcap)  1.47 0.682280 
    HighF   1.43 0.697363 
    MediumF  1.43 0.698157 
    Lnpb  1.39 0.719865 
    Cash-to-Assets  1.28 0.782137 
    Debt-to-Assets  1.24 0.807919 
    Bidask  1.11 0.897861 
    Ebit-margin  1.02 0.980254 
    Mean VIF  1.30   
 
Table 5: Summary report multicollinearity check. 
 
The check yields a mean (max) VIF of 1.30 (1.47) and a mean (min) tolerance of 0.78 (0.68), 
indicating weak multicollinearity (no sign of multicollinearity would yield both VIF and 
Tolerance equal to one). However; our results are far from the cut-off considered problematic 
of VIF (tolerance) equal to 5-10 (0.2-0.1) according to O’Brien (2007), thus we do not see any 
problems in carrying through regressions with the tested variables. 
10.1.3   Regression Results 
Model 1 is conducted without the log-transformation of market capitalization and price-to-book 
ratio. Due to the aforementioned biases introduced by heteroscedasticity, this model will not be 
discussed in further detail. Model 2 through 4 are conducted on the whole sample duration 
(1994-2013), thus the difference lies in the control variables included. Model 2 include only 
target firm characteristic, while Model 3 is also including year dummies with deals done in year 
2013 as reference group. Model 4 add hedge fund characteristic (track record), with low-
frequency (less than 5 deals) hedge funds as reference group. Model 5 and 6 include events 
from 2012-2013, as this is the period of which intervention characteristics on an individual level 
are available. Model 5 includes target firm characteristics in addition to objective dummies, 
with objectives targeting general undervaluation left out as a reference group. Model 6 also 
control for hedge fund characteristics, whether the tactic is friendly of nature, the initial stake 
and a year dummy for 2012. The regression results are reported in full in table 6.  In the 
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following result interpretation, we will focus on the key findings in model 2 through 6, 
emphasizing the statistically robust results. 
 
Cash-to-Assets ratio (CtA) 
The Cash-to-Assets coefficient is statistically and economically significant and positive in all 
models. More cash, all else equal, implies more agency costs to mitigate and hence a higher 
potential for unlocking value (Jensen, 1986). What might be more surprising is the size of the 
coefficient, particularly in model 5 and 6. The overall positive coefficient, as well as its increase 
over time, might explain why activists generally target “cash cows”, and also why they seem to 
shift focus to companies with even heavier cash balances over time. 
 
Price-to-Book ratio (Lnpb) 
The coefficient of the “Lnpb” variable is significant and negative in models 2 through 6. As we 
use the price-to-book ratio as a proxy for over/undervaluation, interpreting the negative sign is 
straightforward; the more a company appears overvalued, the less is the predicted LTARs. The 
effect is significant and stable over time, looking at model 5 and 6. While the sign of the 
coefficient was expected, we find its significance a bit surprising, as the Fama-French 
framework explicitly accounts for the price-to-book ratio in the estimation of normal returns 
through the HML factor. Its significance when considering abnormal returns indicate that the 
value-companies (low PB) outperformance of growth-companies (high PB) is even greater in 
our sample than what the Fama-French framework accounts for in the normal returns. A 
possible explanation may be that the price-book ratio is working as a proxy for factors affecting 
the possibilities to create long-term value in the target companies. Hence a low P/B-ratio might 
be a manifestation of other non-identified factors contributing to encourage activist value 
creation. In addition, The HML-factor is in fact only incorporating the value vs. growth firm 
aspect, while the included P/B-ratio may capture features beyond that. 
 
Bid-Ask Spread (Bidask) 
The “Bidask”-coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level and negative in all models where 
included (model 4 through 6).  As we use the bid-ask-spread as a proxy for illiquidity, this is 
an intuitive result.  Higher illiquidity, all else equal, might reduce exit possibilities and, inter 
alia, complicate a sale of the company, which according to Greenwood and Schor (2009) is the 
cases which create the highest abnormal returns. The results are in opposition to the liquidity 
premium theory, stating that illiquid assets should be accompanied with higher returns. What 
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is also interesting is the increase in economic significance of the coefficient when looking at 
only 2012-2013 (model 5 and 6). This supports our theory that targeting liquid stocks has 
become an issue of more importance over the years due to increased monitoring of activist 
hedge funds (and hence trading leakage), calling for more liquid stocks to faster and “stealthier” 
accumulating stocks, without being an “elephant in the jewelry store”, causing severe run-ups 
before having accumulated their stake. 
 
High-Frequency Hedge Funds (HighF) 
The coefficient on “HighF” is significant and positive when considering the whole period 
(Model 4). The coefficient suggests that HFFs outperform LFFs on average. A possible 
explanation might be that the HFFs possess skill, knowledge or experience making them 
superior to LFFs. Looking at model 5 and 6 (considering only 2012-13), the coefficient is 
insignificant.  
 
Friendly tactics (Friendly) 
The coefficient in front of “friendly” is significant and negative in Model 6, indicating that 
“hostile” tactics are predicted to earn higher LTARs than friendly ones. The results are 
somewhat counterintuitive, as we have earlier described the costs of activism, which is 
significantly higher when considering “hostile” tactics than “friendly” ones. One explanation 
may, however, be that “hostile” tactics (including public criticism, proxy threats and proxy 
fights) work in a more disciplining and credible manner on the board and management, possibly 
resolving agency problems to a larger extent than “friendly “tactics. Another possible 
explanation may be that a hedge fund would only carry through a hostile investment tactic if 
the expected gains are really high.  We emphasize again, however, that these are ex-ante tactics 
from the statements in the SC 13D, thus we have no guarantee that the activist stating a friendly 
tactic did in fact carry that through, and vice versa. 
 
Market Capitalization (ln(mcap)) 
In all models but model 4, the coefficient is insignificant, and thus will not be discussed 
comprehensively. This was initially expected as market capitalization is explicitly accounted 
for in the Fama-French normal return estimation though the SMB factor. The “ln(mcap)” 
coefficient is significant at 5%-level and negative in Model 4, when considering 1994-2013, 
controlling for year-specific effects and hedge fund characteristics.  
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Effects on Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
Table 6: Effects on LTAR regression output. 
The panel reports the effects on long-term (12 months) abnormal returns in hedge fund target firms from different target firm characteristics, hedge fund characteristics, intervention 
characteristics and year dummies. 6  unique regressions are conducted(Model 1 through 6) with 12 month abnormal returns in activist hf targets from announcement date being the 
dependent variable in all of them; however differing in independent variables included. Accounting and  share price data  is gathered  from the last available  report from  the fiscal year 
prior to announcement "Debt-to- Assets" is the total debt to total assets, "Ebit-margin" is the EBIT to total revenues, "Cash-to-Assets"  is defined as total cash and short-term investments to 
total  assets. "P/B" is the share price to equity book value per share, while "Lnpb" is its natural logarithm. "Mcap" is a firm's market cap, calculated as total shares outstanding times the 
share price. "Ln(mcap)" is its natural logarithm."Bidask" is the bid-ask spread of the stock."HighF" ("MediumF") is a dummy equal to one if the deal is done by a high-frequency (medium-
frequency) activist hedge  fund with over 10 (between 5 and 10) deals  on its track  record. Low-frequency hedge funds, with less than 5 deals, are left as a reference group."Capstruc", 
"Strategy", "Sale" and "Gover" are dummies equal to one if the objective of the deal was to target either the Capital structure, the business strategy, to sell the company or the corporate 
governance. Deals where the general objective was to gain from stock-price appreciation are left out as a reference group. "Friendly" is a dummy equal to one if the activist tactic in the 
particular deal is considered friendly. "Stake" is the initial stake accumulated when the hedge fund file the  SC 13D. Year dummies are equal to one if the deal happened in the 
corresponding year. Emphasize on the fact that variables regarding objectives, tactic and stake are only available on deals from 2012-2013, inevitably reducing our number of observations 
in model 5 and 6. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
    (94-13) (94-13) (94-13) (94-13) (12-13) (12-13) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Target firm 
characteristics Cash-to-Assets 0.360*** 0.492*** 0.491*** 0.454*** 1.039*** 0.916*** 
  (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) (0.137) (0.279) (0.324) 
        
 EBIT-margin 0.000559 -0.000191 0.000461 -0.000199 0.0825 0.0988 
  (0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00153) (0.00178) (0.130) (0.137) 
        
 Debt-to-Assets -0.0810 0.0263 -0.000451 -0.0242 0.271 0.301* 
  (0.0900) (0.0888) (0.0875) (0.105) (0.176) (0.180) 
        
 PB -0.0118**      
  (0.00597)      
        
 Mcap -0.0000012***      
  (0.00000021)      
        
 Ln(PB)  -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.156*** -0.143*** -0.153*** 
   (0.0238) (0.0250) (0.0294) (0.0491) (0.0476) 
        
 Ln(Mcap)  -0.0155* -0.0105 -0.0221** -0.0244 -0.0242 
   (0.00870) (0.00950) (0.0111) (0.0162) (0.0170) 
        
 Bidask    -0.311*** -0.521*** -0.622*** 
     (0.0844) (0.117) (0.166) 
        
Hedge fund 
characteristics HighF       0.118***   -0.0359 
     (0.0410)  (0.0657) 
        
 MediumF    0.0618  -0.0261 
     (0.0507)  (0.0819) 
        
Intervention 
characteristics Capstruc         -0.0565 -0.0857 
      (0.0726) (0.0797) 
        
 Strategy     0.0594 0.0386 
      (0.0819) (0.0913) 
        
 Sale     0.0561 -0.0199 
      (0.0991) (0.0917) 
        
 Gover     0.0990 0.0447 
      (0.0749) (0.0732) 
        
 Friendly      -0.174** 
       (0.0732)    
        
 Stake      0.982 
       (1.091) 
        
 Constant 0.244*** 0.336*** 0.207*** 0.240*** 0.201* 0.265* 
  (0.0270) (0.0502) (0.0687) (0.0802) (0.117) (0.151) 
        
 Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
        
 
Heterosk.rbst 
stderrors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
VIF & Tolerance 
check for 
multicollinearity Ok Ok Ok Ok Ok Ok 
        
  R-squared 0.024 0.067 0.099 0.131 0.279 0.340 
  Observations 1102 1102 1102 761 127 127 
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10.1.4   Remarks and Limitations 
Objective dummies 
As read from the results, the dummy variables accounting for the stated objective of the 
intervention are not significant in any model. One might have suspected that this was due to a 
high correlation between the objectives and the other target firm characteristics, however, we 
have inspected this issue, and it turns out not to be the case. At first glance, these insigificant 
results may seem a bit counterintuitive, as several research papers have emphasized the 
predictive power of the activist objectives. Greenwood and Schor (2009), e.g., show that the 
abnormal returns are on average significantly higher in the cases where the target is ultimately 
sold. Again, however, we stress two important differences between the Greenwood and Schor 
(2009) study and ours.  First, Greenwood and Schor look mainly at short-term abnormal returns, 
rather than long-term, as done in this report. One could immediately think of the possibility that 
stated objectives have determining power on short-term returns, as we have concluded that the 
short-term abnormal return is driven by a probability weighted incorporation of the benefit 
associated with activist intervention. Thus, different objectives might lead to different 
expectations and hence different returns in the short-run. In the long-term, however; the returns 
will adjust to reflect actions actually undertaken. Second, as mentioned, our objectives are ex-
ante, while Greenwood and Schor use ex-post objective. For example, while they look at 
companies where the governance was actually targeted, we look at companies where the 
intention is to target the governance. The overall conclusion is that our results on long-term 
returns are by no means contradicting the results of Greenwood and Schor on short-term returns. 
 
Omitted regressors 
In addition to the included regressors, the inclusion of variables acting as proxies for the 
following characteristics could potentially increase the strength of the conducted analyses: 
1. Business diversification (the Herfindahl Index looking at sales across business units), as we 
wanted to see whether the LTAR could be higher in companies where the business 
diversification is high, i.e. investigating potential patterns regarding activism and conglomerate 
discounts (Thorburn and Eckbo, 2013). 
2. Ratio of institutional ownership, as we want to uncover patterns of whether high or low 
institutional ownership might have an effect on LTARs, as literature is a bit unclear at this point. 
While Brav et al. (2010) argue that institutional shareholders is an advantage for activist, 
10    EXPLAINING THE CROSS-SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL RETURNS 81 
 
Cheffins and Amrour (2012) argue that it might be unfavorable for activist hedge funds with 
large institutional investors present. 
3. A quantification of corporate governance (GINDEX, the number of takeover defenses), to 
uncover potential relationships between the number of takeover defenses and returns, with the 
hypothesis that the more takeover defenses present, the more potential value is available to 
unlock. 
4. The executive compensation in the particular target companies, to see whether the long-term 
abnormal returns can increase in companies with high executive compensations as a 
consequence of wealth expropriation, as suggested by Brav et al. (2008).  
 
However, the first three have not been available to the authors due to database limitations, while 
the last one is only available for a limited number, bringing our effective observations down 
below our minimum cut-off.  We do not consider any significant correlation between the four 
omitted variables and our included regressors, thus, we consider the potential omitted variable 
bias to be ignorable.  
 
10.2   Cross-Sectional Differences in STARs 
Having examined the cross-sectional differences in LTARs and its drivers, we next try to 
explain the cross-sectional differences in STARs. The lion’s share of the regressors are identical 
as in the LTAR-analyses, thus we refer the reader to chapter 10.1.1 for an in-depth description 
of them. The econometric pitfalls, in addition to the remarks and limitations from the LTAR-
analyses are also applicable for this analysis. For this, we refer the reader to chapter 10.1.2 and 
10.1.4 respectively. In the following section, we will settle with a discussion of the regressors 
unique for this analysis, as well as the regression results. 
10.2.1   Unique regressors 
“Crisis” is a dummy variable equal to one if the particular event was announced in times of 
economic crisis, i.e. during the dot-com crisis or the financial crisis.  
 
“LTAR” is the long-term abnormal return, which was the dependent variable in the regressions 
conducted in chapter 10.1. We include it as a regressor to see whether the market correctly 
anticipates the long-term gain from activist intervention already in the days surrounding 
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announcement. As the LTAR is, by construction, not available until twelve months after 
announcement, including it as a regressor is somewhat inconsistent as all the other regressors 
are ex-ante figures. Nevertheless, due to our curiosity on the topic of efficient markets, we 
include it in some of our specifications. 
10.2.2   Regression Results  
Model 7 includes all the target firm characteristics (logarithm of market capitalization and price-
to-book ratio), except for the bid-ask spread as regressors. In addition, it includes the LTAR, 
and the crisis-dummy. In Model 8, we include the bid-ask spread, as well as the hedge fund 
characteristics, however, leave the LTAR and crisis-dummy out. Model 9 adds the crisis-
dummy to Model 8, while Model 10 also adds the LTAR. The difference between Model 7 and 
Model 10 is the inclusion of bid-ask spread, reducing the number observations somewhat. While 
Model 7 through 10 are run on the whole sample duration (1994-2013), Model 11 and Model 
12 are run only on the time period of 2012-2013. This is, again, due to the inclusion of the 
intervention characteristics, which are only available on an single event level for this period. 
This leads to an inevitable drop in the number of observations. In Model 12, we also include 
the LTAR. The crisis-dummy is of natural reasons excluded in both Model 11 and 12.  The 
following interpretation will focus on the key findings in model 7 through 12. 
 
Long-term abnormal returns (LTARs) 
The LTAR-coefficient is statistically and economically significant, and positive in all 
specifications where included. Thins might imply that stock markets anticipate the long-term 
gains from activist intervention, already in the short-term. Interestingly, the coefficient is 
remarkably larger in the models run on the 2012-2013 subsample. This might suggest that 
markets have become more efficient, more correctly reflecting the expected gains. However, 
due to the relatively small number of observations, we do not put too much emphasize on this 
increase in coefficient size. We also stress the fact that the inclusion of this regressor introduces 
a mix of ex-ante and ex-post regressors, somewhat confusing the interpretation of the 
coefficient. For now, we settle with the results that the LTARs significantly contribute to 
explain the STAR, suggesting that stock markets somewhat reflects the expected long-term 
gains already in the (-12, +10) window. 
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Crisis 
The crisis coefficient is significant and negative in all models where included. This suggests 
lower STARs in times of economic crisis, than in times with economic stability. The results 
support our findings from the previous STAR-analyses, indicating lower STARs in times of 
economic crisis. For a discussion on the potential reasons for this pattern, we refer the reader to 
chapter 8.2. 
 
Intervention characteristics 
The objective dummies are again insignificant in all specifications. While this may seem to 
contradict earlier research (e.g. Greenwood and Schor, 2009) we again stress the fact that these 
are ex-ante observations. In addition, the relatively small number of observations with explicitly 
stated objectives and the fairly narrow categories may complicate the possibility to obtain 
significant results. 
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Effects on Short-Term Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 :Effects on Short-Term Abnormal Returns 
 
The panel reports the effects on short-term (-12, +10) abnormal returns in hedge fund target firms from different  target  firm characteristics, hedge fund  
characteristics, intervention  characteristics, year dummies and LTARs. 6 unique regressions are conducted (Model 7 through 12) with STARs in activist hf targets 
being the dependent variable in all of them, however differing in independent variables included. Accounting and share price data  is gathered  from the last 
available report from  the fiscal year prior to announcement. See Table 6 for variable description not mentioned here.Year dummies are equal to one if the deal 
happened in the corresponding year. “Crisis” is a dummy equal to one if the event took place in a period of economic crisis. Where “crisis” is included, no other 
year dummies are included. LTAR is the long-term abnormal returns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
  
   (94-13) (94-13) (94-13) (94-13) (12-13) (12-13) 
    Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Target firm 
characteristics Cash-to-Assets 0.0514 0.0797 0.0692 0.0264 -0.0166 -0.212 
  (0.0550) (0.0733) (0.0703) (0.0691) (0.113) (0.135) 
        
 EBIT-margin 0.000198 -0.000366 -0.000238 -0.000135 0.0287 0.00943 
  (0.00067) (0.000956) (0.000952) (0.000856) (0.0864) (0.0731) 
        
 Debt-to-Assets 0.0572 0.0209 0.0141 0.0165 -0.0904 -0.157 
  (0.0480) (0.0677) (0.0674) (0.0655) (0.113) (0.105) 
        
 Ln(PB) 0.00383 -0.0181 -0.0157 -0.00260 -0.0527** -0.0205 
  (0.01000) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0249) (0.0228) 
        
 Ln(Mcap) -0.00331 -0.00547 -0.00551 -0.00296 -0.000338 0.00416 
  (0.00352) (0.00449) (0.00401) (0.00383) (0.0109) (0.00926) 
        
 Bidask  -0.000835 -0.0156 0.00640 -0.0781 0.0473 
   (0.0309) (0.0265) (0.0258) (0.136) (0.106) 
                
Hedge fund 
characteristics HighF  0.00115 -0.00488 -0.0151 -0.00219 0.00628 
   (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0394) (0.0376) 
        
 MediumF  0.000428 -0.00351 -0.00925 -0.0234 -0.0173 
   (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0421) (0.0387) 
        
Intervention 
characteristics Capstruc         -0.0442 -0.0233 
      (0.0364) (0.0334) 
        
 Strategy     0.0337 0.0223 
      (0.0487) (0.0467) 
        
 Sale     -0.0527 -0.0509 
      (0.0518) (0.0491) 
        
 Gover     0.00393 -0.00163 
      (0.0373) (0.0342) 
        
 Friendly     -0.0374 0.000504 
      (0.0593) (0.0475) 
        
 Stake     1.092 0.924 
      (0.744) (0.599) 
                
Other LTAR 0.101***   0.0907***  0.209*** 
  (0.0163)   (0.0185)  (0.0717) 
        
 Crisis -0.0422**  -0.0447* -0.0636**   
  (0.0214)  (0.0270) (0.0276)   
        
 Constant 0.0539** 0.113** 0.106*** 0.0742** 0.0857 0.0301 
  (0.0222) (0.0463) (0.0311) (0.0303) (0.102) (0.0841) 
        
 Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
        
 Heterosk.rbst stderrors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
VIF & Tolerance check 
for multicollinearity Ok Ok Ok Ok Ok Ok 
        
  R-squared 0.076 0.034 0.017 0.074 0.136 0.259 
  Observations 1072 746 746 746 127 127 
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11    Conclusion 
 
“What turns me on, is the excitement of it all. I really believe in what I’m doing. Don’t get me 
wrong. I like to win. But I love to rock boats that should be rocked. Sometimes I wonder why I 
keep doing it. I’ve got enough goddamn money” Carl Icahn to Fortune, March 1985.  
 
Hedge fund activists have been rocking boats for a long time. Through a comprehensive event 
study, we show that they have been able to create significant abnormal returns both in the short-
term and long-term. The funds’ approach to uncover value in target companies, consistently 
targeting underperformers with low valuations, shows a high degree of competency to pick 
companies in need of restructurings. Furthermore, we show that their stock picking extends 
beyond this, by creating long-term abnormal returns, even in business cycle downturns.  
 
Further, we show that there has been a development in characteristics of target firms. We find 
that they target cash-rich companies with low valuations and debt ratios, with poor performance 
and high liquidity in the stock compared to NYSE/AMEX companies. Further, we illustrate a 
larger spread in market capitalization of targets, as well as increasing cash levels in the firms 
compared to earlier decades.  
 
After conducting several analyses and statistical tests, we show that the short-term wealth 
effects associated with activist hedge fund intervention are seemingly positive, abnormal and 
significant. This applies both in economically stable times as, well as in times of crisis; 
however, the short-term CARs in crisis are lower. Furthermore, high frequency funds and low 
frequency funds generate indistinguishable abnormal returns in the short run. Over the longer 
haul, we find that the activist hedge funds’ overall ability to create alpha is consistent, both in 
downturns as well as in economically stable periods. 
 
We find that cross-sectional analyses on short-term and long-term CARs yield several 
significant relationships. First, low valuation, large amounts of cash, high trading liquidity and 
a hostile investment tactic seem to be valid predictors for an increased long-term CAR. Second, 
economic downturns appear to significantly predict lower short-term CARs. Moreover, the 
long-term CAR is a significant predictor of short-term CAR, indicating that capital markets 
efficiently reflects the long-term gains from activist intervention, discounted for the probability 
of failure.  
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Appendix A:    Enhanced Literature Review  
 
This chapter constitutes other topics within the activist hedge fund literature and related themes, 
not directly covered in the thesis, but which the reader may find interesting, and/or fulfilling. 
Potential Wealth Expropriation in Activist Hedge Fund Literature  
The empirical discoveries of activist hedge funds delivering positive abnormal returns to target 
firms’ shareholders in the short- medium and long-term have also been a natural starting point 
for discussions and research on the fundamental sources of these returns.  Most widespread is 
the conviction that the positive observed abnormal returns to shareholders are attributable to 
hedge funds’/hedge fund managers’ skills to create value through actions and engagement, 
and/or simply pick undervalued stocks. However, some research papers have taken it a step 
further, investigating whether the positive abnormal returns to shareholders are, in fact, due to 
hedge fund activists unlocking value, or whether it can be fully or partially attributed to an 
expropriation of wealth from other stakeholders (primarily executives and creditors) to 
shareholders. 
 
Brav et al. (2008) found no significant evidence of value expropriation from creditors even in 
their cleanest tests, where the target firm was unlevered. In fact, in the absence of creditors, 
they found somewhat higher short-term returns for target shareholders. They concluded value 
expropriation of bondholders was an unlikely source of shareholder gains. Nevertheless, they 
also examine the possibility that some of the shareholder gain may be traceable to losses for 
executives. They find that target firms experience a significantly higher CEO turnover rate and 
increased executive pay-for-performance after activist intervention, as well as a curtailing of 
executive compensation in the ballpark of $1 million p.a.  Their back-of-an-envelope 
calculation yields that if the executives combined pay is cut by $5 million annually for five 
years, using an appropriate discount rate, this would be equivalent to an income stream in the 
magnitude of $20 million, which is a significant portion of the market cap of the average target 
firm ($706 million). 
 
Supporting the findings of Brav, that the sources of shareholders’ gains are not explained by 
expropriation of wealth from creditors is the research paper of Aslan and Maraachlian (2009), 
who finds that bondholders, as well as shareholders, earn positive abnormal returns around 
announcement of activist interventions by hedge funds. When looking at a longer term, however 
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they find target bonds significantly underperform their benchmark from the event year by 3-5% 
per year. They conclude that expropriation of wealth is not a significant source of stockholder 
gains, reasoning that combined positive short-term and negative long-term effects on creditors’ 
wealth net out each other. However; their results also reckon that target firm creditworthiness 
is more often downgraded than upgraded one year after activist announcement.  Similar results 
on credit ratings are found in Byrd, Hambly and Watson (2007), Li and Xu (2010), Klein and 
Zur (2011) and Burkart and Dasgupta (2014), who all find a disproportionately large number 
of rating downgrades for target firm’s bonds. 
 
On the other hand, there is also empirical evidence of significant value expropriation of 
creditors’ wealth to the shareholders’ benefit. Li and Xu (2010) examine the impact of hedge 
fund activism on the target firm’s bank loan contracts.  They show that hedge fund activism has 
a substantial impact on a target firm’s bank loan contracts through channels like higher spreads, 
stricter covenants and collateral restrictions and shorter loan maturities (due to increase in 
leverage ratios and payout ratios, as well as decreases in cash on hand). They conclude that the 
target firm shareholder gains might be, to unknown extent, explained by a wealth expropriation 
effect leaving the creditors as the losing part, particularly when the activist hedge fund targets 
the capital structure of the target firm. 
 
Furthermore, Klein and Zur (2011) look at the impact of activist hedge funds on the existing 
public market bondholders. Their results conclude that the expropriation effect is definite; while 
shareholders gain, creditors earn a significant negative excess returns both around the initial SC 
13D filing date, and in the subsequent twelve months. This effect can again be traced back to 
the increase in leverage- and payout ratios, as well as a decrease in assets and cash-on-hand. 
They conclude that on average (and in 83% of the incidents) the hedge fund manager’s actions 
harm bondholders’ wealth. 
Operational Performance and Improvements 
Activists have for some while been characterized as shortsighted financial engineers, so a 
natural research area is the operational performance of the target firm, where there has not yet 
been conclusive evidence. Boyson and Mooradian (2007) find that companies experience 
increases in ROA, cash flow, payout and Tobin’s Q, but a decrease in cash holdings, in line 
with Clifford (2008). Brav et al. (2010) exhibits improvement in valuation ratios (Tobin’s Q) 
but a close to 0 difference in ROA compared to pre level profitability (t-1y and t+2y).  However, 
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Klein and Zur (2006), using only 2 years of data (155 events from 2003-2005) find no 
significant improvement in accounting performance 1 year after the intervention, but merely 
that EPS, ROA and ROE decline. They find increased debt levels, reduction of cash and 
attribute returns to the perceived benefits of reducing the agency costs of cash. However, when 
Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang(2013) analyze a longer time span, 5 years after the event date with 
over 2000 events from 1994-2007, they find improvement in operating profitability (ROA) 
compared to the year of the intervention. They find no evidence of decline in operating 
performance post-intervention analyzing a longer-time period. These findings are consistent 
with Zhu (2013), using the same dataset. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) compare operating 
performance with both control groups and each other with respect to frequency (number of 
deals). They find an improvement only for targets of high frequency activists (at least 10 deals). 
Further, Clifford (2008) investigates 788 activist engagements and compare them with passive 
investments in the same time period (1998-2005), finding larger improvements in ROA 
following the acquisition for activist targets compared to passivists targets, and attribute the 
increases to spinoffs of underperforming assets.  In a paper by Brav et al. (2013), the authors 
find an increased productivity of plants: 3 years prior to intervention targets experience higher 
productivity than control plants (similar size, age and industry) in a given year. The productivity 
is found to deteriorate to the level of control plants during intervention, but found to rebound 
to higher level than observed pre-activism within 3 years of post-intervention, suggesting real 
improvements not merely financial engineering skills. Long-term improvements are also found 
with hostile and leverage enhancing deals (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2013).  
Corporate Governance 
What is so far written on governance within hedge fund activism is diverse, but often heading 
in the same direction; Hedge funds are better positioned to engage in activism than institutional 
investors due to different incentives and organizational structure than i.e. mutual funds (Brav 
et al. 2008). Without the restrictions imposed on mutual funds, pension funds etc. hedge funds 
avoid the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Partnoy and Thomas, 2006), yielding the 
opportunity to operate outside securities regulation and registration requirements through 
imposing constraints on investor types in the hedge funds (Brav et al. 2008). The compensation 
policy, where a large portion of the fund managers salary is performance based, and the 
exemption from regulations allowing hedge funds to use the derivatives markets make hedge 
funds more suited to mitigate the free-rider problem related to monitoring than mutual- and 
pension funds.  However, due to accumulation of small stakes, activists must rely on persuasion 
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and internal governance mechanisms to take action and implement proposed changes (Cohn 
and Rajan, 2012). Even though several papers focus solely on theoretical models, some 
empirical research has been done, indicating: CEO compensation is reduced in target firms 
(Brav et al. (2008), employees increase productivity while wages stagnate (Brav, Jiang and Kim 
(2013). Further, models are proposed to answer the effect empty voting has on corporate 
governance (Brav and Mathews (2011), showing a possible efficiency improvement if certain 
conditions are met. The theoretical model from Cohn and Rajan (2012) outlines the optimal 
corporate governance in the presence of an activist investor, seeking to minimize the conflicts 
between managers, investors and boards. We outline the most important papers related to 
corporate governance and Hedge fund activism in detail in the subsequent chapter. 
 
Regulations and Organizational Setup:  
There are important differences between the legal features of a hedge fund and pension or 
mutual fund. Legal scholars argue this is one of the important reasons why hedge funds are 
uniquely positioned to engage in activist campaigns (Clifford, 2008; Bratton, 2006; Briggs, 
2006; Kahan and Rock, 2006; Partnoy and Thomas, 2006). Lack of regulation, distinctive 
organizational structures and greater financial incentives all play a part. We will later deep dive 
into the legislative perspective, but we feel it is time to understand the mechanisms of the hedge 
funds, understanding its role as both a corporate monitor and its unique position to strengthen 
corporate governance in target firms. Clifford (2008) argues that since hedge funds are not 
subject to ERISA, nor required to maintain diversified portfolios or subject to liquidity 
constraints similar to mutual funds, hedge funds have greater flexibility. Further, they are not 
bound by regulation to not use leverage or derivative instruments, which they often use to 
increase effective ownership in target firms (Hu and Black, 2006). Managers of the hedge funds 
often also receive incentive fees equal to 20% of annualized returns, yielding significant 
financial incentives and larger marginal compensation for increased effort compared to pension 
and mutual fund managers (Clifford, 2008). Moreover, activist hedge funds have advantages 
compared to corporate raiders due to smaller stakes accumulated, often benefiting from 
cooperation with management and receiving greater support from other shareholders. Brav et 
al. (2006) calls this a hybrid internal-external role, suggesting a potentially value enhancing 
position by reducing the agency costs associated with separation of ownership and control. 
Clifford (2008) also argues that hedge funds possess another tool important increasing 
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negotiation power; the threat to buy the firm. If the market for partial corporate control is not 
disciplinary enough, the market for complete control lies at the fund’s disposal. 
  
Stakeholders and compensation policies:  
 
Related to stakeholders and compensation policies, Brav et al. (2008) show that Hedge fund 
activism differs fundamentally from other activist engagement efforts by institutional investors, 
which in several papers have been found improbable to increase shareholder value (Black, 
1998; Karpoff, 2001; Romeno, 2001; Gilland and Starks, 2007). Brav et al. (2008), as 
mentioned, find a redistribution of wealth from CEOs to shareholders through declining 
payments to CEOs. During the event year, CEOs at target firms earn on average $914000 more 
than peer companies, while they one year after are not distinguishable from the peer group. 
Moreover, they find an increase in pay-for-performance programmes during the event year and 
the year after. The change in payment is accompanied by an increase in the CEO turnover rate, 
and in total they find that on average $20m may be switched to shareholders in present value 
terms. They finally argue their finding is in conjunction with the hypothesis of “stock picking 
vs. causality”, where there is unlikely that such changes would’ve occurred without the 
interference of the hedge fund. Other stakeholders, such as employees have also been in the 
empirical researchers’ spotlight, Brav, Jiang and Kim (2013) provide research on how hedge 
fund activism affects employees. They find increased productivity at plants within 3 years of 
post-intervention compared to pre-activism. Further, employees at targeted firms seem to be at 
a disadvantage: they increase productivity while wages seem to stagnate. The increase in labor 
productivity is found significant only in industries highly unionized – suggesting stricter 
monitoring of workers (Pagano and Volpin (2005).  
Increasing the geographical span: research outside the U.S 
While most of the research on activist hedge funds and their target firms examine the US 
market, there are some studies addressing this phenomenon in other markets. Becht et al. (2007) 
did a clinical study on the Hermes U.K Focus Fund, a UK based activist pension fund. They 
found that the fund substantially outperformed the benchmark, and traced the abnormal returns 
to engagements rather than to stock picking. Further, Becht, Franks and Grant (2010) examined 
the hedge fund activism in Europe, and found significant abnormal shareholder returns around 
the date of the activist stake disclosure. Their findings were robust for several European 
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jurisdictions, and also concluded that local jurisdiction did not explain the differences in return 
across countries. There has also been increased activity in Japan, where Hamao, Katsuna and 
Matos (2010) have studied ten years of investor activism in Japan.  Their story is the same as 
many of their European and American peers; positive abnormal returns to target firm 
shareholders around announcement day, with ambiguous long term returns. The latest addition 
to the collection of research on hedge fund activism outside the US, to our knowledge, is 
Mietner and Schweizer (2013), who looks at activism in hedge funds versus activism in Private 
Equity Funds. Their findings are that the announcement of an activist hedge fund or a private 
equity fund acquiring at least 5% of a company’s voting rights triggers a significantly positive 
abnormal return. However; the long term buy-and-hold-abnormal-returns are negative for both 
samples. 
Specialized Topics Within Hedge Fund Activism: 
Countless research papers have also been devoted to other aspects of hedge fund activism, and 
the spread of topics covered is significant. We will give a brief description of the papers which 
have come to the authors’ knowledge, in a chronologic order. 
 
Gillan and Starks (1998) got the show on the road, collecting data form a survey on shareholder 
activism, sketching the origins and evolution of shareholder activism, defining what it was and 
why it occurred. On the brink of a decade later Gillan and Starks (2007) outlined the history 
and an updated evolution of shareholder activism in the U.S tracing it back to the SEC’s 
adoption of Rule 14a-8 in 1943) up until the paper was written, also touching topics like the 
activists’ motives for active participation and returns to shareholder activism, finding that the 
major motivation for any shareholder to become active is the potential to enhance the value of 
their investment through monitoring. However; due to free-rider problems regarding 
monitoring, only large shareholders will obtain returns on their investments that offsets the 
associated monitoring costs. Their conclusion on returns to shareholder activism are in line with 
the research done on hedge fund activism; short-term positive abnormal returns, little to none 
evidence of improvement in long-term stock performance. 
 
Brav et al. (2010), except from findings concerning returns, value expropriation and 
governance, looked closer at the returns to the activist hedge fund investors and found that 
activist hedge funds on average outperformed a full sample of self-reported hedge funds. The 
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results were also significant when comparing to a subset of equity oriented funds, their results 
was in line with Boyson and Mooradian (2010) who found that activist hedge funds provided 
strong returns for their own investors. Furthermore, Edmans, Fang and Zur (2011) looked at the 
effect of liquidity on corporate governance finding that liquidity, all in all, increases the 
likelihood of a block acquisition (>5% stake) through a positive effect on governance. 
 
Cheng (2012) explored the relationship between hedge fund activism and accounting 
conservatism, and found that hedge fund activists elicit increases in accounting conservatism, 
suggesting that target firms improve both governance and financial reporting quality. Gantchev 
and Jotikasthira (2012) aimed to answer the question: Does institutional exist facilitate 
emergence of value-enhancing activists? All their results suggested activist hedge funds 
accumulate their shares when other institutional investors sell theirs.  
 
Cheffins and Armour (2012) defined “the market for corporate control”, and developed a model 
for activism, weighting the costs of activism (financing, monitoring, transaction costs) up 
against the benefits (publicly shared or private). They further defined the supply- and demand 
side of the market for corporate influence, and used it to talk about past trends and development 
(both pre- and mid financial crisis) and likely future trends of hedge fund activism. In addition, 
Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang (2013) addressed hedge fund activism during the financial crisis, 
finding no evidence that activist hedge funds’ target firms were more adversely affected than 
comparable firms. 
 
Brav et al (2013) examined whether the positive returns associated with hedge fund activism 
was mainly due to stock picking, by studying cases where the activists changed filings from 
13G to 13D (from passive to active).  Their results suggested that the improved performance in 
target firms would not have occurred if the hedge fund was a passive investor.  Katz and Owen 
(2013) considered activism’s impact on diversified investors and the market as a whole, 
proposing that some conditions exist, where activism would not necessarily increase the total 
value of the market, i.e. that activists may profit at the expense of others. 
 
Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang(2013) focuses on the pre-disclosure accumulation of shares by activist 
investors, which is possible because of the ten-day window allowed from crossing 5% 
ownership until an SC 13D must be filed. However, they argue that activist hedge funds in fact 
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do not exploit this ten day window to “secretly” accumulate shares, nor do they in many cases 
have the possibility because of low threshold poison pills. 
 
Gantchev, Gredil and Jotikasthira (2013) look at the spillover effects of hedge fund activism, 
finding that the threat of being targeted has a disciplining effect on peer firms, increasing their 
returns and lowering their ex-post probability of becoming targets themselves.  Somewhat 
similar concerns are addressed by Aslan and Kumar (2014) who looks at spillover effects of 
hedge fund activism on the product market competitors, customers and suppliers of target firms. 
However, their findings indicate a negative abnormal return of target firm peers’ stocks around 
announcement of activism. 
 
Burkart and Dasgupta (2014) assessed whether hedge fund activism is a pro-cyclical 
phenomenon with respect to macroeconomic conditions. Their conclusion, that hedge fund 
activism is indeed pro-cyclical, is supported both by the peaks of SC 13D filings in bull markets, 
and by findings regarding increased leverage- and payout ratios ex-post.  
 
Finally, Collin-Dufrense and Fos (2014) examined whether prices can reveal the presence of 
informed trading, inspecting SC 13D filings with information on trades. Their evidence 
suggested that measures of adverse selection and illiquidity were lower when SC 13D filers 
accumulated shares, concluding trades by SC 13D filers contain valuable information 
Agency costs, Free-Rider Problems and Management Entrenchment:  
In the line of M&A activity, some researchers have proposed that activist funds improve 
corporate governance due to the potential monitoring effect the funds may stimulate. Briggs 
(2007) shed some light over how the funds have acquired a real power in the field of corporate 
governance: the combination of “wolf pack” tactics and the increasing influence of activist 
proxy advisory firms. They argue that corporate governance has “unquestionably” been 
improved if the wolf pack and (threats of) proxy fights for corporate control causes management 
to reexamine their business and review basic strategy accordingly, acting as a monitoring 
mechanism itself. Further, Gantchev, Gredil and Jotikasthira (2013) investigates the effect 
targeted firms have on peers. The authors outline empirical evidence yielding higher probability 
for a firm targeted in a specific industry if heightened rate of activism in the industry has 
previously occurred.  They find that the threat of being targeted has a disciplining effect on peer 
102 APPENDIX A:    ENHANCED LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
firms, reducing agency costs and improves performance alongside actual targets, which leads 
to abnormal returns, and lower the ex-post probability of being targeted. Furthermore, they 
suggest this may be due to the presence of a partial feedback effect. Overall, they conclude 
shareholder activism may act as a monitoring mechanism, reaching beyond targeted firms, in 
line with Burkart and Dasgupta (2014): “activist blockholders play a key role in limiting the 
governance problem that affects publicly traded corporations with dispersed owners who have 
limited incentive to monitor managers”. A theoretical model is proposed by Burkart and 
Dasgupta (2014), who study blockholder activism by funds that compete for investor flow. 
Their model finds that activists are able to increase value of target firms through monitoring; 
reasoning that competition for investor flow strengthens their incentives to enhance returns 
generated by the monitoring. Further, several empirical studies (Clifford, 2008; Klein and Zur, 
2009; Brav, Jiang and Kim 2010) find increases in leverage and payout ratios following activist 
investments. In line with theoretical literature on agency costs (Grossman and Hart, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; and Myers, 2007), this should reduce value-destroying 
activities and lower agency costs, all else equal.  
However, agency costs may also come as a consequence of activist investing. Cohn and Rajan 
(2012) investigates the optimal corporate governance in the presence of an activist investor and 
propose a theoretical model in the case where the board is dragged between an activist investor 
and a manager facing reputational concerns. Disputes between the management and activist 
derive as a consequence of managers needing to reverse strategic decisions made historically. 
Management may therefore oppose value-enhancing changes. The argument is supported by 
Boot (1992) whom argues that a manager will not divest often enough due to reputational 
concerns regarding reversing prior investment decisions. However, Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2009) suggest that the threat of a hostile takeover can mitigate the agency costs and encourage 
divestitures. These agency costs are analyzed, and Cohn and Rajan (2012) conclude that internal 
governance and external governance (provided by activists) are natural complements unless the 
external governance is weak.   
Agency costs could also decrease as a result of activism; shareholder activism can play an 
important role in pressuring firms to adopt de-staggered boards. Studies provide empirical 
evidence yielding lower firm value for companies with staggered boards than those without 
(Bebchuk and Cohen, 2004). An explanation suggested is the value lost from not allowing a 
potential value-enhancing takeover to occur due to management entrenchment. Kahan and Rock 
(2007) argues hedge funds are more active and better suited to mitigate the free-rider problem 
of monitoring than institutional activist. They suggest, in line of Brav et al. (2008) that the 
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organizational structure, incentives and regulatory predicaments hedge funds may avoid 
compared to mutual and pension funds are the main reasons. Kahan and Rock (2007) conclude 
that no regulatory intervention is warranted on activist hedge funds because it is unclear to what 
extent hedge fund activism is driven by excessive short termism; hedge funds usually need the 
support of other, less short-term oriented constitutes to affect corporate policy, and to the extent 
short-termism generates a problem, adaptive devices adopted by corporations are a better way 
to address it than regulation. Further, Bratton (2007) argues that even though activism leads to 
fiduciary duties towards the entity when board seats are acquired, the activists’ independence 
and financial incentives imply a more critical stance toward management than other outside 
directors. The author concludes that activists are “more distanced from management and 
arguably better positioned to approach corporate governance’s theoretical ideal of a vigorous 
outside monitor”, similar to Brav et al. (2006). Clifford (2008) argues in line with Bratton 
(2007) and Brav et al. (2006): The organizational  and compensation policycharacteristics of a 
hedge fund, including its ability to look-up capital, appears to increase its incentives and relative 
bargaining power with the management or board, contributing to mitigate the free rider 
problem. Empirical research has also been done in the field, Boyson and Mooradian (2007) find 
that activists pursuing aggressive and well-defined objectives act as agents of corporate change.  
Further, Bratton (2007) target firms in the period of 02-06, and finds that two results coexist 
but in tension: “On the one hand, the activists’ record of governance success is impressive 
enough to support the proposition that they have shifted the balance of corporate power in the 
direction of outside shareholders and their financial agendas, perhaps heralding a modification 
of the prevailing description of a separation of ownership and control. On the other hand, the 
stock portfolio comparisons, taken together with the changing financial and performance 
characteristics of the targets, cast doubt onto the existence of financial incentives sufficient to 
support a significant alteration of the governance equilibrium, suggesting that the success in 
targeting governance may be a negative net present value game. 
Brav and Mathews (2011) investigates the issue of empty voting and the efficiency of corporate 
governance (empty voting, relating to the issue of accumulating voting power in excess of 
economic share ownership, to manipulate vote outcomes and generate positive returns). Despite 
not being directly linked to activist hedge funds, it provides an important insight into empty 
voting in many cases used by Hedge funds. In the field of empty voting, researchers are not 
harmonizing: Hu and Black (2006, 2007) proposes an enhanced regulatory framework, 
illustrating with several cases where Hedge funds have taken short position in stocks while at 
the same time borrowed shares to vote down on buyout proposals. Christoffersen et al. (2007) 
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however, argues that “vote trading” may increase the corporate governance efficiency because 
information about proposals may be costly to acquire and fully understand for uninformed 
shareholders.  However – this requires some sort of mutual agreement on future interests of the 
company from the Hedge fund and uninformed shareholder.  Brav and Mathews (2011) propose 
a theoretical model, showing that the cost of voting against firm value enhancing initiatives can 
be offset by a larger probability that the trader will vote to maximize firm value.  
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Appendix B:    Sample Selection Criteria for Selected Studies 
 
We have summarized some of the articles analyzed to give the reader an understanding of 
common selection criteria, emphasizing both time trends and how different researchers have 
collected their samples. This is by no means all articles reviewed, but a large part of the ones 
most closely related to our thesis, in that order.  
 
Author 
Selection criteria, focusing on 
number of activist events Research topic Journal Events* Time Span 
      
Bebchuk et al. (2013) 1. All investors who filed 13D in 
the period 
Pre-disclosure 
accumulation by 
activists 
Journal of 
Corporation 
Law 
2040 1994-2007 
 2. Localized Hedge Funds among 
them through various sources 
    
      
Brav et al. (2008) 1. All investors who filed 13D in 
the period 
Abnormal 
returns, firm 
performance and 
wealth 
expropriation  
Journal of 
Finance 
1032 2001-2006 
 2. Localized Hedge Funds among 
them 
    
      
Clifford (2008) 1. Collect dataset of hedge funds Abnormal 
returns - active 
blocks vs. passive 
blocks for hedge 
funds 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
788 
activist 
blocks 
1998-2005 
 2. Find 13D's filed by these funds   1114 
passivist 
blocks 
 
      
Klein & Zur (2009) 1. Collect all 13D's in period Abnormal 
returns for 
hedge fund 
activists with  
Journal of 
Finance 
151 2003-2005 
 2. Localize hedge funds, and 
restrict all events with general 
agenda 
an explicit 
agenda, 
comparing 
against other 
activists 
   
 3. Use websites, newspapers and 
CISDM hedge fund database 
    
      
Klein & Zur (2011) 1. Find all filings between 1994-
2006 
Wealth 
expropriation - 
impact on 
bondholders 
Working 
Paper  
193 1994-2006 
 2. Find 625 hedge fund events, 
with only 193 yielding sufficient 
information 
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Greenwood & Schor 
(2009) 
1. Merge all 13D's and DFAN14A Abnormal 
returns - 
researching 
objectives and 
success 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
784 
hedge 
fund 
events 
1993-2006 
 2. Cross reference 13D's against 
13Fs 
  196 
non-
hedge 
fund 
events 
 
 
 
 
     
Stokman (2007) 1. Found hedge fund activists Abnormal 
returns - for both 
Europe and U.S. 
Working 
Paper 
90 in 
the U.S. 
2000-2007 
 2. Collected these activists' 13Ds   188 in 
total 
 
      
Brav et al. (2010) 1. Use dataset from Brav et al. 
(2008) 
Review of hedge 
fund activism  
Foundations 
and Trends 
in Finance 
1059 2001-2007 
 2. Hand-collect for 2007 following 
same steps as  the previous 
article 
    
      
Boyson & Mooradian 
(2007 & 2010) 
1. Obtain sample of hedge funds Abnormal 
returns, 
emphasizing 
objectives 
Review of 
Derivatives 
Research 
397 1994-2005 
 2. Identify activists with fund size 
of min 10m USD 
    
 3. Collect all 13D's for these funds     
      
Boyson & Mooradian 
(2011) 
1. Find Hedge funds from Lipper 
TASS 
Abnormal 
returns for high 
frequency funds 
and low 
frequency funds 
Working 
Paper 
272 1994-2005 
 2. Includes only well-established 
funds 
    
 3. Collect target firms      
      
Gantchev et al. (2013) 1. Start with a list of 13D's from 
Dow Jones Newswires 
Spillover effects 
of hedge fund 
activism 
Working 
Paper 
1281 2000-2011 
 2. Find hedge funds through 
various sources 
    
 3.Download all 13D for the final 
list of hedge funds 
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Gantchev & 
Jotikasthira  (2012) 
1. Start with a list of 13D's from 
Dow Jones Newswires 
Whether 
institutional exits 
facilitate the 
emergence of 
activists 
Working 
Paper 
1191 2000-2007 
 2. Find hedge funds through 
various sources 
    
 3.Download all 13D for the final 
list of hedge funds 
    
      
Gantchev (2012) 1. Start with a list of 13D's from 
Dow Jones Newswires 
Net returns - 
monitoring costs 
and abnormal 
returns  
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
1164 2000-2007 
 2. Find hedge funds through 
various sources 
    
 3.Download all 13D for the final 
list of hedge funds 
    
      
Aslan & Kumar (2014) 1. Hand-collect list of activist 
hedge funds 
Product market 
effects of hedge 
fund activism 
Working 
Paper 
1610 1996-2008 
 2. Subsequently use this list to 
find 13Ds 
    
      
Hamao et al. (2010)  1. Hand-collect block-
shareholding filings from various 
sources 
Activism in Japan Working 
Paper 
916 1998-2009 
 2. Identify which investors 
constitute activist investors 
    
 3. Collect additional information 
if necessary  
    
      
      
Becht et al. (2007) 1. Data from Hermes  Clinical study of 
returns to 
Hermes U.K. 
Focus Fund 
Working 
Paper 
41 1998-2004 
 2. External data from Datastream 
and LSPD 
    
      
Becht et al. (2010) 1. Use a fund and a public 
database 
Hedge fund 
activism in 
Europe 
 362 2000-2008 
      
      
Zhu (2013) 1. Utilizes Brav et al. (2008)'s 
dataset 
Effectiveness of 
hedge fund 
activism in 
preventing 
corporate policy 
deviations 
Working 
Paper  
1264 1994-2007 
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Edmans et al. (2012) 
1. Use Factiva search to localize 
hedge funds 
The effect of 
liquidity on 
governance  
Review of 
Financial 
Studies 709 1995-2010 
 
2. Employ the list of hedge funds 
to collect needed filings     
      
Sunder et al. (2011) 
1. Use list of hedge funds 
provided by Brav et al. (2008) 
Debt holder 
responses to 
activism 
Review of 
Financial 
Studies 1649 1995-2008 
 2. Collect their 13Ds     
* When stated to collect or find 13D's, it is done through SEC's Edgar database 
** Unique target firms in cases where total events not listed 
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Appendix C:    Box-Plot Diagrams  
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Appendix D:    Early Evolution of Shareholder Activism 
 
Early 1900s – Smouldering Activism 
 
Shareholder activism in the U.S. is, in fact, an over 100-year old story, despite its presence in 
headlines being a quite new phenomenon.  Gillan and Starks (1998; 2007) write that American 
insurance companies, mutual funds and banks were kicking it off already in the early 1900s, 
being active participants in U.S corporate governance through board members. 
 
However, in the decades to come, laws were passed inhibiting the financial institutions’ ability 
to have concentrated power and thus an active role in corporate governance. Among them was 
the first Glass-Steagall Act from 1932, prohibiting U.S banks from owning equity directly. In 
addition, regulatory reforms succeeding the stock market crash in 1929 made it costlier for 
financial investors to actively engage the governance of firms. The result was a broadening of 
the gap between ownership and control, not to be constricted until 50 years later during the 
corporate raiders and LBO boom in the 1980s (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Other legislative changes 
with impact was the Securities Exchange Act from 1934; which established the Securities and 
Exchange Comission (SEC), and the Investment Company Act of 1940, defining the 
responsibilities and limitations placed on open-end mutual funds and closed-end funds that offer 
investment products to the public.  
 
Some also argue that shareholder activism can be traced back to 1932, when Lewis Gilbert, a 
young owner of 10 shares, attended his first annual meeting of New York City’s Consolidated 
Gas Co. He was alarmed by the lack of communication between the company’s management 
and owners (Talner, 1983 cited in Gillan & Starks, 1998), and consequently started attending 
annual meetings to ask questions to corporate management. Nevertheless; the shareholder 
activists in the 1930s and early 1940s were rarely effective, as they had a hard time garnering 
enough support to effect any significant change. The lion’s share of shareholders would divest 
their shares rather than engage in any form of activism in order to express their dissatisfaction 
with the company’s governance or activities. This was called “the Wall Street Walk” (Huynh, 
2010) 
 
1940s-1970s – The Origins of the Current Activism Wave 
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In 1942-1943 SEC introduced a rule (which is the predecessor of today’s rule 14a-8 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934) allowing for shareholder proposals for inclusion of corporate 
ballots. This was the starting shot for a slow, but secure, change in both identity and focus of 
shareholder activists. As a consequence of the rule, Lewis Gilbert (and his brothers) started 
utilizing proxy processes to pursue issues related to corporate governance. According to the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries (ASCS), 92 stockholder proponents submitted 607 
shareholder proposals in the first ten years after the implementation of the 14a-8 Rule (Gillan 
& Starks 1998; 2007; Talner, 1983). The shareholder activism from 1942 through the end of 
the 1970s was mainly dominated by individual investors. “Proxyteers” such as Louis Wolfson 
and Robert Young became widely notorious in the 1950s after launching several proxy battles 
contesting board control in major U.S. public companies (Karr, 1956; Cheffins & Armour, 
2012). In addition, in 1948, James Peck, a member of the Congress for Racial Equality, 
purchased one share of Greyhound stock to raise the issue of integrating bus seating in the South 
to the management at the annual corporate meeting. This may, albeit with limited success, have 
been the start of a new branch of activism; the social one. Social activists started utilizing the 
proxy process, illustrated by when a shareholder group sought restrictions on Dow Chemical 
Company’s sale of napalm. 
 
Towards the end of the 70s, shareholder activism became more effective, mainly attributed to 
early signs of the institutional investors’ rise and the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (Huynh, 2010). 
 
The 1980s – The “Deal Decade” 
 
The 1980s is still known as the “Deal Decade”, predominantly due to a wave of LBOs, corporate 
raiders and hostile takeovers, where investors bought large number of shares to gain significant 
voting rights and unlocked value by engineering and utilizing both aggressive and innovative 
financial techniques to force through massive takeover bids. While these raiders were generally 
in the market for corporate control, trying to discipline boards and managements, a significant 
portion of them also resembled today’s offensive hedge fund activists. For example, Charles 
Bludhorn, chairman of the conglomerate Gulf & Western (G&W), pursued undervalued 
companies to buy, using G&W as an investment medium. In 1981, G&W owned a stake in 
excess of 20% in 5 companies, and a stake exceeding 5% in “nearly a dozen more”  (Cheffins 
& Armour, 2012). Other corporate raiders followed similar patterns by accumulating significant 
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minority stakes in public companies, using other public companies as investment platforms. 
The utilization of public companies as investment mediums, rather than investment funds, was 
influenced by a safe harbor in the Investment Company Act of 1940 which restricted investment 
funds from carrying out the kind of offensive activism present during the deal decade. However, 
publicly traded companies which had business on their own, and had no more than 40% of their 
assets invested in stocks of other companies, were exempt from this legislation (Cheffins & 
Armour, 2012) 
 
At the same time, the 1980s saw a radical increase in the involvement of institutional investors, 
political groups and “gadfly” investors; investors who advocated for change through the use of 
shareholder proposals and attendance at shareholder meetings, stridently grilling the 
management. The individual activists from the 70s relapsed while the large institutional pension 
funds, mutual funds, “gadfly investors” and corporate raiders were there to play (Kahan & 
Rock, 2007). 
 
The current form for institutional activism, however, is by many said to be descended from 
Jesse Unruh, the seminal California state treasurer. In 1985, he formed the Council of 
Institutional Investors as a response to the greenmailing of Texaco by the Bass Brothers. At the 
time, Unruh was the director of two of the largest funds in the U.S.; the California Public 
Employees Retirement System (CalPEERS) and the California State Techers Retirement 
System (CalSTRS). He founded the council as he discovered that Texaco, in which the funds 
under his management were heavily invested, paid a $137 million premium to Bass Brothers to 
avoid a takeover, while the premium was not offered to other investors. The Council of 
Institutional Investors was established to lobby for shareholder rights, and became a focal point 
for institutional shareholder activists (Monks & Minow, 1995; Gillan & Starks, 1998). In 
addition, the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, was founded in 
1985 to advise clients in proxy contest (Briggs, 2007). ISS has later had clients like Carl Icahn 
in his proxy contest against the drug maker Forest Laboratories in 2012. 
 
The late 1980s may also be considered the starting point for several of today’s most prominent 
activist hedge funds as a handful of activists started to operate via private investment funds.  
Steel Partners was founded by Warren Lichtenstein in order to buy 9% of Kinark, a minor 
Oklahoma steel galvanizing company considered undervalued. In 1993, Steel Partners II was 
launched as a hedge fund with mandate to invest in undervalued firms and, if necessary, engage 
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actively to increase shareholder returns. Steel Partners later turned out to be one of the most 
prominent activist hedge funds during the 2000s, and is still a going concern.  
 
Another high-profile investor rising out of the world of LBOs in the 1980s was Carl Icahn. He 
was a well-known corporate raider in the 80s, and has been one of the most influential hedge 
fund activists up to present. However, Carl Icahn was not part of the pioneer hedge fund cohort 
(Cheffins & Armour, 2012). Carl Icahn hunted alone through a New York based brokerage 
firm, and made his first dip into activism with a nearly 10% stake in Tappan Co., a household 
application manufacturer, in 1978. By the mid-1980s, Icahn’s acquisitions were made through 
a conglomerate of partnerships, ultimately backed by Icahn and 40 “silent partners”. 
Nonetheless; his label as a “lone wolf” held true as Icahn’s take accounted for approximately 
80% of net profits. Mr. Icahn has since his first stake in Tappan Co. unquestionably been among 
the most noticeable activists, well-known for his positions in underperforming companies and 
his unconditional and relentless pushes for change, well-illustrated by his confrontations with 
Texaco in the 80s and RJR Nabisco in the 90s. 
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Appendix E:    Section 13 
 
This is supposed to give the reader a more thorough understanding of the filing system, and act 
as a continued pharagraph to 6.1.1 
 
There is important information needed to be disclosed when the intention is to exercise control 
(proxy fight, acquire board seats etc.). Lawsuits may occur if one tries to exercise control in 
other ways than stated in section 4: If an investor violates the section, such as filing false 
information, one can receive civil lawsuits initiated by either management or other shareholders 
who sold their shares without knowing the consequence of the actions. Furthermore, SEC can 
impose both criminal and civil penalties, such as prohibiting the block holder from voting, or 
impose criminal sanctions (Edman, Fang & Zur, 2011). 
 
There is also an extension to the 13D, a 13D/A, an amendment. This must be filed within ten 
days if a material change to any of the items in the original 13D occurs (such as item 4), or a 
change in ownership exceeding 1% (accumulating shares) or similar happens. However, since 
we are most interested in the initial filing, we place small emphasis on these filings. 
Furthermore, 13Ds’ counterpart is the 13Gs.  The most important difference between a 13D and 
13G filing is the intention of the investor. 13G filings refer to non-active investors, and contain 
more lax deadlines and less strict rules when increasing ownership. In addition, a passive 
investor only has the option to file a 13G, and is by definition not obligated (Edman, Fang & 
Zur, 2011). The non-active aspect is defined as when the investor “can certify that they did not 
purchase or do not hold the securities for the purpose of changing or influencing control over 
the issuer” (SEC). The issue of control is harder to define, but has been noted by Charles Penner 
in Schulte, Roth & Sabel LLP’s Activist Investing Developments newsletter as “when an 
investor intends to obtain outright control over a company or to assist others in doing so, such 
as planning an offer to purchase the company or an attempt to gain majority control of a 
company’s board. However, other seemingly more benign activities, including the type of 
“shareholder activism” practiced by many large investors today, may also be deemed to 
demonstrate an intent to change or influence the control of a company.” Hence, filing a 13G 
reduces the likelihood and opportunity to engage in activism (Edman, Fang & Zur, 2011), and 
we subsequently choose to focus on 13Ds in line with previous research on activism (Brav et 
al; 2008, Klein & Zur; 2011, Greenwood & Schor; 2009, Bebchuk et al; 2013) 
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Appendix F:    Comprehensive Methodology 
The Event Study Outlined 
Event studies follow a long line of empirical literature on analysis of value creation around 
corporate events (Lo & MacKinlay; 1997, and Fama Fisher, Jensen & Roll; 1969). Eckbo 
(2007) defines event studies as examining the behavior of a firm’s stock prices around corporate 
events. In alignment with their approach, we consider the seven major steps in building an event 
study. Furthermore, we add an eight step following the analysis of value creation in M&A by 
Haugen and Ulseth (2009); the need for analyzing possible competing explanations. We utilize 
the event study framework both when addressing the short-term and long-term return 
characteristics of hedge fund activist intervention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A: Eight steps involved in properly performing an event study 
 
The first step of an event study is obviously to define and classify the event of interest, which, 
in our case, are hedge fund activist involvement in U.S. public companies from 1994 to 2013. 
In the lion’s share of our events, we consider the SC 13D-filing date as the event date, while in 
the cases where the hedge funds accumulate stakes below the five percent mark (i.e. not 
triggering the obligation to file) the event date is set to the first date on which the activist stake 
is publicly known. 
 
Further, we determine the event window. The event window must, preferably hold some basic 
properties. First, it must obviously surround the event date. Second, we want it to be wide 
enough to cover all of the event’s measurable effects, nevertheless; narrow enough to minimize 
the noise introduced by widening the window, namely effects unrelated to the event taking 
place in the event window (see chapter 5.3).  Due to problems with exactly measing when the 
Define event 
of interest 
Identify selection 
criteria for inclusion 
of events 
Determine the 
estimation window 
Present findings 
according to design 
Determine the 
event window 
Select normal 
performance 
model 
Design testing 
framework for 
abnormal returns 
Analyze 
competing 
explanations 
116 APPENDIX F:    COMPREHENSIVE METHODOLOGY 
 
 
information reaches the market, standard practice is to expand the event window both before 
(𝑇1) and after (𝑇2) the addressed event. The estimation window should be prior to, and not 
overlapping with the event window, and is used to determine the parameters of the normal 
performance model (in our case the Fama-French and momentum parameters) to which the 
realized performance data will be compared. Overlapping event and estimation windows would 
lead to an estimation of normal return parameters affected by the event, and as the normal return 
is by construction the expected return in absence of the event, this is, needless to say, 
undesirable.  If the study also considers the subsequent performance of the company, a post-
event window is employed to measure performance in the period immediately following the 
event (Haugen & Ulseth, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B: sequencing of estimation window, event window and post event window. 
 
The subsequent step is to determine the selection criteria by which events are included. We 
refer the reader to the data chapter for a discussion on this topic.  
 
Further, to be able to single out the effects of the highlighted events, the realized performance 
characteristics must be compared to a normal return, i.e. the expected return in absence of the 
event according to a selected pricing model. The parameters needed to estimate the normal 
returns are, as mentioned, calculated in the estimation window which has to be determined. The 
estimation window should run well in advance of the event itself in order to calibrate the 
selected performance model (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
Next, the formulation of the null-hypotheses introduces the statistical testing of the results of 
study. Depending on the size of the sample, statistical inferences about the return effects of the 
event can be made from statistical testing of such hypotheses.  As small samples may not fulfill 
the statistical properties needed to confidently make econometric inferences, we design our 
study to preserve a large sample. Significant deviations from the null-hypothesis lead to its 
rejection, and suggests that the alternate hypothesis may be true. An example would be a null-
hypothesis stating that the announcement of hedge fund activism intervention is not 
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accompanied by a run-up in the target firm stock. A deviation from this of statistical 
significance would suggest that the announcement of hedge fund activism is accompanied with 
an abnormal run in the target firm stock, positive or negative, based on the sign of the deviation. 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing and Econometrics 
 
Since the true outcome of the relationship between the effect and outcome is not available, we 
rely on statistical techniques to obtain estimates allowing us to make inferences about the given 
effects and outcomes. We next devote time to methodological issues and potential approaches 
to ensure valid results. First, we use standard regression analysis to determine the significance 
of different factors, following a long line of empirical literature (e.g. Brav et al. 2010; 
Greenwood and Schor 2009). Second, we propose utilizing subsamples by analyzing median 
and average values. The subsample analysis is characterized by a subset of the total samples 
that share one or several characteristics. Testing potential differences in these subsamples will 
help us indirectly determine important factors characterizing the phenomena activist hedge 
funds.  
Regression Analysis and its Pitfalls 
 
In general, one uses regression techniques to be able to describe and evaluate the potential 
relationship between a dependent variable, the regressand, and one or several explanatory 
variables, the regressor(s) (Woolridge; 2002). Academics (Walpole et al; 2002) argue 
regression suitable for (1) obtaining estimates regarding individual coefficients, (2) screen 
variables to determine which ones yield significant effect on the regressand, or (3) arrive at the 
most effective predictive equation. For our thesis’ purpose, we are primarily interested in the 
potential variables screened to determine if coefficients yield estimates supporting our theories 
and hypothesis. Furthermore, we employ it to predict abnormal returns in various ways. We 
denote the regressand as y and the regressors as 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘. The standardized equation takes 
the form: 
𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1,∗ 𝑥1 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑥2+. . +𝑏𝑘 ∗ 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢   (7) 
The model in (7) is representation of the observed relationship seen in (8) 
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𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝐵1 ∗ 𝑥1 + 𝐵2 ∗ 𝑥2+. . +𝐵𝑘 ∗ 𝑥𝑘   (8) 
The u term represents the disturbance term included to capture effects in the model unexplained 
by the linear regression.  
Coefficients in (1) are estimated by using optimization procedures dependent on the sample 
size. We have chosen to use three different regression tools used when suited, (i) the standard 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), (ii) the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and (iii) Logit 
Regression. Where in (iii) we look at the marginal increase in predicted probability of obtaining 
positive long-term abnormal returns as one increase the corresponding regressor by one unit, 
conditional on the fact that we are looking at a company with average values at all independent 
variables, yielding a 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
  marginal relationship. 
We show the functional relationship for OLS, minimizing the sum of squared distances between 
observed and predicted values. When using several regressors, we obtain a multiple regression, 
where the OLS estimates are obtained in the following manner: 
|
|
𝑎
𝐵1
𝐵2
.
.
.
𝐵 𝑛
|
|
= (𝑋𝑇 ∗ 𝑋)
−1
∗ 𝑋𝑇 ∗ 𝑌    (9) 
Where 𝑋 is a (t)*(n+1) matrix including all (t) observations of (n) regressors in its columns, 
also containing a column describing the constant (Haugen & Ulset; 2009). Furthermore 𝑌 is a 
(t)*(1) matrix containing all observations of the regressand.  
We refer the reader interested in the goodness of fit estimate ( 𝑅2 ) and joint statistical 
significance (F-test) to Wooldridge (2002) or Dougherty (2011).  
We believe a multiple regression model will be critical in explaining the variability in the 
abnormal returns, the regressand. Hence, we need to decide which regressors should be included 
in the process. Walpole et al. (2002) suggest a stepwise regression method when independent 
variables become significant in numbers. The reasoning behind this is to ensure introducing 
only variables with explanatory power, testing them each step on the way whether they are 
significant by employing the test for joint significance (F-test) and subsequently the t-test. One 
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believes the model should be complete once the goodness of fit estimate does not increase 
beyond a predetermined threshold.  
We also check our sample for multicollinearity, which is when two or more regressors are 
highly correlated, complicating the ceteris paribus interpretation of the regressions. In addition, 
multicollinearity might increase the standard errors, hence reduce the t-values, complicating 
statistical inference even though the OLS estimates are still the Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimators (BLUE). To formally detect the potential multicollinearity we examine the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance (T) of each of the regressors. 
𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑥𝑖 =
1
1−𝑅2𝑥𝑖
    (10) 
𝑇𝑥𝑖 =
1
𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑥𝑖
     (11) 
Where 𝑅𝑥𝑖
2  is the 𝑅2 from the regression of 𝑥𝑖 on the other covariates.  
Further, because of the substantial variation in the values of the different variables, the results 
might suffer from heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is basically when the variance of the 
disturbance terms are inconstant, i.e.: 
𝜎𝑢𝑖
2 ≠ 𝜎𝑢𝑗
2      (12) 
where both i and j are in-sample observations.  Heteroscedasticity does not necessarily mean 
that the disturbance term will have a particularly large value for particular values of the 
independent variables, however; it increases the probability of erratic disturbance terms. 
Heteroscediasticity will not cause biased coefficients, nonetheless, OLS-estimators will no 
longer be BLUE and their variances will not be the lowest of the unbiased estimators (White, 
1980). We formally test whether the disturbances are homoscedastic by conducting a White 
Test. 
Subsample Analysis 
 
This analysis is a powerful tool helping us determine whether two subsamples’ corresponding 
populations have equal or unequal means. In our case, we are able to divide the total sample 
into different economic cycles, frequency of activist funds and more.  
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The significance of the averaged CARs can then be tested against a null-hypothesis that 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
0 by using standard t-testing where a t-value is compared to a critical value corresponding to a 
particular significance level,  to check whether one can reject the null-hypothesis or not. 
𝑡 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎
√𝑁
 
In some of our analyses, we are also interested in potential differences in 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑠  between 
subsamples, i.e testing the null-hypothesis that the difference in CAR between two sub-samples 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This can be tested statistically by executing a t-test 
for testing differences in means, generating a t-value, again comparing it to a critical value 
corresponding to a desired significance level.  
𝑡 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2
√
𝑉𝐴𝑅1
𝑛1
+
𝑉𝐴𝑅2
𝑛2
 
In both tests we reject the null-hypothesis if  
|𝑡| >  𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 
One of the assumptions of the t-test is that the two samples are normally distributed. If they are 
not, one can assume either that with increasing sample size they will be (Central Limit 
Theorem), or use a non-parametric test procedure. The latter sidestep the assumption of 
normally distributed data. However, the downside of these tests lies in the less efficient 
estimates computed. Detecting the non-normality in data can be ensured by Shapiro-
Wilk/Francia tests.  
We employ both one-sample and two-sample Wilcoxon test, we show the theoretical 
relationship in the following. The first is called the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, making 
inferences about a population median. One subtracts the hypothesized median from each 
observation and thereby assign a rank to the differences (Woolridge; 2002). The null-hypothesis 
is that the median equals the hypothesized median. Thereafter, one sums up the ranks of 
negative and positive observations to test the lowest of the sums against the critical value, 
rejecting the null-hypothesis if the value is equal or less than the critical value.  
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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With the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (two samples) one uses the same approach as the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, and one calculates the test statistic with the following formula: 
𝑢1,2 = 𝑤1,2 −  
𝑛1,2 ∗ (𝑛1,2 + 1)
2
 
where w1and w2are the smallest ranked − sums for both observations.  
Subsequently, the minimum of 𝑢1,2 is compared to the critical value, where the null-hypothesis 
is rejected if the statistic is equal or less than the critical value, following the signed-rank test. 
We employ both tests in line with Walpole et al. (2002) to take advantage of their strengths. 
  
(16) 
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We also conduct two logit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the corresponding LTAR is positive, and zero if negative. The two regressions, model 
7 and model 8 are equal, in terms of regressors, as model 4 and model 6 respectively. The results 
are reported as a whole in the end of this chapter. A logit regression is used, basically, to model 
dichotomous outcome variables by modelling the log odds of the outcome (positive LTAR) as 
a linear combination of the regressors. In other words, our logit models aims to estimate the 
probability for achieve positive LTARs for given values of the included regressors.  In general, 
the logistic regression function can be written as, 
 
𝑃 =
𝑒𝛼+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
1 + 𝑒𝛼+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
 
 
where P is the probability of 1, “e” is base of the natural logarithm and the alphas and betas are 
the parameters, as in a normal linear model. The results of the regressions are largely similar to 
those obtained in the linear regressions. The probability for positive LTARs is increasing in the 
Cash-to-Asset ratio (Model 7 and 8), while a decreasing function of the price-to-book ratio 
(Model 7 and 8) and the bid-ask-spread (Model 7 and 8). In addition, in model 8, the logit 
regression predicts the probability for positive LTARs to be lower for interventions stating 
friendly tactics than hostile. Lastly, in Model 8, objectives targeting capital structure is 
predicted to have a lower probability to obtain positive LTARs than objectives targeting general 
undervaluation.  
 
The coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal increase in predicted probability of obtaining 
positive LTARs as one increase the corresponding regressor by one unit, conditional on the fact 
that we are looking at a company with average values at all independent variables. Thus, in 
model 7, when considering the average company, an increase in the Cash-to-Asset ratio of 1 
(equaling 100 percentage points) would be predicted to increase the probability of obtaining 
positive LTARs by 28.2 percentage points. More practical, an increase in the Cash-to-Asset 
ratio of 1 percentage point would be predicted to increase the probability of obtaining a positive 
LTAR by 0.282 percentage points. 
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One point is, however, important to stress. While being a strong analytical tool, yielding us an 
important sanity check regarding our previous linear regressions (model 1-6), we do not 
emphasize the logit regressions too heavily. The reason is the dichotomization of the dependent 
variable (the long-term abnormal returns). Forcing it into a two-category system removes the 
lion’s share of the variation in LTARs which we are in fact trying to analyze, leaving us unable 
to identify potentially important differences in cases earning extremely high positive (negative) 
LTARs and extremely low positive (negative) LTARs.   
 
    (94-13) (12-13) 
    Model 13 Model 14 
Target firm 
characteristics Cash-to-Assets 1.312** 6.811** 
  (0.657) (2.917) 
    
 Ebit-margin 0.00814 1.231 
  (0.0125) (1.573) 
    
 Debt-to-Assets -0.154 2.355 
  (0.510) (1.626) 
    
 Lnpb -0.625*** -1.087*** 
  (0.147) (0.409) 
    
 Ln(mca)p -0.0112 -0.234 
  (0.0589) (0.157) 
    
 Bidask -1.216*** -5.843*** 
  (0.462) (2.225) 
    
Hedge fund 
characteristics HighF 0.381* -0.353 
  (0.199) (0.568) 
    
 MediumF -0.129 -0.374 
  (0.231) (0.686) 
    
Intervention 
characteristics Capstruc   -1.774*** 
   (0.680) 
    
 Strategy  -0.0595 
   (0.751) 
    
 Sale  -0.981 
   (0.741) 
    
 Gover  0.325 
   (0.744) 
    
 Friendly  -2.096*** 
   (0.717) 
    
 Stake  -1.143 
   (7.425) 
    
 Constant 1.114** 4.358*** 
  (0.480) (1.581) 
    
 Year dummies Included Included 
    
  Pseudo R-sqrd 0.0581 0.2181 
  Observations 760 127 
 
 
    
